本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2016-2-26 08:35 AM 編輯
! ?) u0 X/ n2 A1 z# p& QTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。
! y# n ~) E* A, ~0 T! kHONG KONG AND CHINESE IDENTITY TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。0 Y5 G- J: [; C$ L
Hong Kong people identify strongly with a set of Western liberal-democratic core values and therefore with institutions that represent these values, such as the ICAC 11 and the judiciary. Trust in the legislature is, however, low (Wong, Hsiao and Wan 2009) and satisfaction with the government and political parties fluctuates at levels similar to other pluralistic states in East Asia or in Western democracies (ibid., Cheung 2009).The low identification with the political institutions can largely be attributed to their lack of power and un-democratic nature. Surveys have indicated that Hong Kong people have a strong need for a responsive and democratic government and legislature (DeGolyer 2009), a fact which is further emphasized by the frequent mass protests for universal suffrage and by the pro-democracy forces always gaining about sixty per cent of the popular vote.
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$ d- o* H8 x3 o; r6 \6 XTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。Although the local cultural identity of the Hong Kong people is strong, it coexists with an abstract identification with a historic and cultural vision of the Chinese nation and Chinese identity. The official perspective of the Beijing regime on national identity, however, sees identification with the Chinese nation as equal to identification with the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Chang 2001). The civic elements of Hong Kong identity stand in clear opposition to this notion of Chinese identity, as the Hong Kong people largely reject the idea of “loving”the CCP or the Communist state.12 This identity clash is further intensified by the fact that the PRC national identity’s strong ethnic and cultural undertones include xenophobic and anti-Western sentiments (Chang 2001: 137, Lo 2008: 174). In fact, Beijing’s understanding of national Chinese culture is a hybrid of Communist state culture and a perceived monolithic national culture (Chan 2007:380).
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6 q8 b" m- k: n6 y, F# TThe ethno-cultural identification of many Hong Kong people with mainland China is blended by the Beijing regime with political identification with the CCP to form a cultural-political Chinese identity (Lo 2008: 171). Accordingly, patriotism is defined through loyalty to the Communist party and the state. In 2004, Xiao Weiyun, a legal expert from Beijing, explained the official definition of un-patriotic behavior: forging close links with (Western) foreign countries, aligning with groups deemed unacceptable to the CCP and questioning the territorial integrity of China(that is, supporting independence for Taiwan) (Xiao 2004). For many Hong Kong people, however, being part of a modern open society is part of their identity,and the pan-democrats promote a Hong Kong style patriotism, including democratic and participatory elements, such as, the fight for democracy and concrete patriotic actions (Situ 2004a: 174). Democrats reject the claim of the CCP to be the only patriotic force, because the party does in fact suppress China’s people, destroying Chinese culture and all those aspects which are cherished because they represent the idea of a Chinese nation (Situ 2004b: 66). They further argue that a liberal democratic expression of the nation is crucial and should be drawn from a sovereign people because the nation is composed of neither government nor party (Chen 2004: 81). tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb% ^- U$ Z8 Q3 h( `* I6 `
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Identity Politics TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。" N5 q% g/ u6 \0 b
The new emerging local culture and distinct civic identity of Hong Kong are however threatened by the forces of globalization (Choi 2007, Ma 2006), as well as by Chinese nationalism or sinicization. Nationalism is coming into the Hong Kong context on two levels:in the official discourse and policies of the HKSAR and Beijing governments,and also through integration and interaction at grassroots level. tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb; O$ x- N% V6 F! A
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For the regime in Beijing, it is impossible to approve of the ideological cohesion of a Hong Kong cultural identity constituted against the mainland Chinese identity. Any manifestation of a separate, independent cultural identity is viewed as a political threat to the regime in Beijing (Lo 2007: 436). Immediately after the handover, the Hong Kong government launched several programs and initiated policies all aimed at bringing about an active change in the creation of a unified Chinese identity.The measures in the educational realm included, for example, changes in the school curriculum. The PRC began to be portrayed in a much more favorable light, with the focus on economic achievements and rising international status(Vickers and Kan 2003). The most controversial measure, however, was the introduction of mother-tongue language teaching at secondary schools.13 English is seen as a form of cultural and symbolic capital that distinguishes Hong Kong from the mainland and thus the government’s policy was taken as an attempt to alter the collective identity (Chan 2002: 283). The government further strengthened the subject “civic education” in schools (Vickers and Kan 2003)and the national song and national flag featured prominently at educational institutions. To boost the general public’s patriotism and identification with the mainland, the government has produced television announcements in the public interest (API) entitled “Our Home, Our Country” since 2004, and everyday before the evening news the Chinese national anthem together with a clip showcasing the achievements and beauty of China and Hong Kong are aired(Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 74). Government Identity Discourses John Flowerdew(2004) has shown how the administration of Tung Chee-hwa stressed the“Chineseness” of Hong Kong, downplayed democratic development and emphasized the sameness of the mainland and the SAR. The economic discourse predominated, displacing the discussion of democratic reform and constitutional development,and trying to depoliticize the city through a discourse on stability and promoting Hong Kong as an economic city (Morris P., Kan and Morris E. 2000).Hong Kong should also be more culturally integrated with China to prevent foreign political and cultural influence, including, most notably, ideas like democracy and human rights, from “subverting” the mainland (Loh and Lai 2007:29). Tung’s old fashioned governing style, traditional Chinese values and ethnic definition of identity were, however, not in tune with the majority of Hong Kongers. When Donald Tsang took over the position of Chief Executive, he chose a more subtle approach, appearing more open to Hong Kong values and identity while maintaining the policies of fostering patriotism and integration with the mainland. The discourse on the so-called “New Hong Konger”demonstrates, however, that Tsang was carrying forward his predecessor’s political mission. In the 2007 policy address, he stated that after 1997, Hong Kongers had been unsure about their identity and the economic prospects vis-à-vis a rising China. According to his analysis, Hong Kong can only prosper as a fully integrated part of the PRC and the HKSAR’s citizens must look at the city’s development “from the perspective of our country’s future” (Policy Address 2007). Critics have argued that by using the slogan, “New Hong Konger,”Tsang was trying to evoke an association with the famous slogan, “New Taiwanese,” which was aimed at reconciling the sub-ethnic conflicts in Taiwan(An 2007). Yet they point out that the Chief Executive, in fact, attempts to downplay local identity, because, for Tsang, Chinese national identity should indeed be equivalent with the “New Hongkonger” identity (Zhang 2007). / R: a- U5 p, Z- x% Z. I
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。8 Q z. X+ ~, R
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。) b# Q6 N! n P; j1 M
Grassroots Nationalism
L* J, c. z% TIn addition to the policies and discourses of patriotism shaping and defining Hong Kong identity, rapid interaction with the mainland at grassroots level has created a form of “grassroots nationalism” (Ma2007: 149). The bottom-up discourses on nationalism are re-shaping the national imagination of Hong Kong people by bringing the nation closer to the everyday experience of the general public. The Chinese nation is seen by those Hong Kong people who have frequent interactions on the mainland as “a great national territory, a collective of a great diversity of people, an embodiment of familial networks and a huge consumer market.” These new ideas of the nation could result in the formation of a regional hybrid culture incorporating Hong Kong and Chinese components (ibid. 165). He does not, however, pursue this idea further to explain how this new cultural identity is positioned vis-à-vis the civic identity of Hong Kong. 5.39.217.76- j3 h- s# v! s9 B
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EVOLUTION OF TAIWAN IDENTITY
' m; N) _* S _: r, R2 }) {4 fThe notion of a unique Taiwan identity is closely connected with the island’s history. Taiwan was ruled by the Dutch(1624-1661), became part of the Chinese Qing Empire (1683-1895) and eventually a Japanese colony (1895-1945), before the administration of the island was taken over by the Republic of China (ROC) (Cabestan 2005: 32). The “February 28Incident” of 1947 marked the affirmation of a unique Taiwanese identity and created a demand for autonomy and democracy (Chu and Lin 2001: 123). In 1949,with the KMT forces’ to Taiwan, a sub-ethnic cleavage emerged between those who had newly arrived from the Chinese mainland and the Taiwanese – Han-Chinese who had been living in Taiwan for several centuries before 1945. For several decades, the Taiwanese were completely excluded from political participation and power in the higher levels of the institutions. The local culture and language were suppressed because the KMT was intent on propagating its official“great China” nationalism (Schubert 1999: 54). When cautious political liberalization began in the 1970s, the Taiwanese national identity arose and was expressed in native literature which, closely linked with the growing political opposition, called for democracy and participation (Hsiau 2000: 91).With democratization in the late 1980s, the idea of Taiwanization became increasingly prominent; among its aims were to achieve the political and cultural equality of the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the ruling Mainlanders and the KMT brand of Chinese nationalism. Policies under the presidencies of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have contributed to the sharp increase in Taiwan identity.14TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。* o1 U: i; U6 V4 |( i9 m
9 N4 V; H3 e! ?. }/ Y公仔箱論壇Theoretically, the discussion on Taiwanese identity can be divided into three basic discourses (Schubert 1999). Taiwanese ethno-cultural nationalism states that the Taiwan identity is based on specific historical experiences and perceived cultural differences between the Taiwan people and the mainland Chinese; the focus is on the colonial past of the island and its long separation from the China (Schubert 1999: 55). In the multi-ethnic nationalism approach, the Taiwanese nation is conceptualized as a harmonious, democratic and tolerant nation of four ethnic groups, the Mainlanders,the Hoklo, the Hakka, and the aborigines (Zhang 2002). According to political or state nationalism, the foundation of a Taiwan nation is in line with the institutions of a liberal state. The rise of the Taiwan identity is seen as directly connected to its geographical and political separation from China and its subsequent democratic development (Cabestan 2005, Schubert 2004).
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% p) ^% c. s. V& f3 R5.39.217.76HONG KONG AND TAIWAN IDENTITIES
& ?# q" s) w* C- D7 j! Y8 GIf Smith’s framework of national identity based on ethno-cultural and civic components is applied to the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan, a series of similarities and differences is revealed. For along time, both identities were portrayed as rooted in an envisioned homogenous Chinese race and common ancestry. While in Hong Kong, this ethnic element of identity remains strong, in Taiwan, there have long been intense discussions on multiculturalism and ethnic diversity although the idea of an ethnic Taiwanese nationalism has prevailed in some circles of society. Although traditional Chinese culture with its festivals and folklore are dominant in both societies,Hong Kong and Taiwan have both developed cultural identities different to that on the CCP-ruled mainland. In the economic realm, decades of economic boom in Taiwan and Hong Kong, starting in the 1960s and lasting until the 1990s,created affluent societies and generated a sense of pride in these achievements. Hence differentiation through wealth and sophistication from the,at that time, backward PRC prevailed during the first encounters with the mainland in the 1970s and 1980s. Local culture and localism were regarded as cornerstones of an emerging exceptional culture, different not only from the present day mainland way of life, but also from traditional Chinese culture.Hong Kong’s cultural uniqueness was based on a newly developed popular culture and focus on local affairs using the Cantonese language. In Taiwan, the cultural identity also possesses links to modern popular culture, but the identity is dominated by native Taiwanese culture and language which were suppressed in the first decades of KMT rule. Ideas of multiculturalism are common in Taiwan, with its several Chinese sub-ethnicities and the aborigines. Interestingly,these ideas have never been given much attention in Hong Kong, despite its international city image, its strong Indian community and its global workforce.The reason for this is the perception that Hong Kong is a predominantly Chinese society, so that the idea of a distinct hybrid culture functions as“demarcation and territorialization and carves out a distinct subject position for Hong Kong local Chinese only” (Lo 2007: 436). 15公仔箱論壇8 Q/ n1 G% X6 |2 W* T
! j( b7 @% E+ D* w1 d9 R5 A _* Ctvb now,tvbnow,bttvbScholars have argued that the pillar of the distinct identities in both cases is the civic realm of national identity(Mathews 1997, Schubert 2004). During the colonial era, the rule of law, civil liberties, human rights, a free and vibrant press and a responsive government were all things in which Hong Kong citizens felt immense pride. With regard to personal freedoms and institutional guarantees, the city was much more a part of the Western world than of China. Political participation and the desire for democratization became an increasingly important part of the Hong Kong identity after the 1980s. The political reforms of the last governor, Chris Patten,responded to these demands with the result that Hong Kong core values became further entrenched in Hong Kong society. Hong Kong people, since then, have defended their civic identity against real and perceived threats from the government. Surveys have consistently indicated that although, generally,identification with the Chinese is slowly increasing, Hong Kong people still feel distant from China in political and civic terms. This is confirmed by the solid support given to political parties and organizations that stand for Hong Kong’s core values and further democratization, as well as by the high attendance in related political campaigns and rallies.
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Within the civic identity of the Taiwanese,the desire for democracy and the equality of the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the Mainlanders are closely connected. In the authoritarian era of KMT rule, the opposition saw the practice of democracy and the democratization of institutions as the only way of achieving truly equal opportunities for all the citizens of Taiwan. The civic identity of the Taiwanese was formed through the struggle of the opposition movement for representation and the democratic transformation of the KMT government. The experience of a successful and peaceful democratic transition is a matter of great pride for the Taiwanese.Compared with Hong Kong, civil liberties and democratic values, as well as group mobilization and cohesion, are equally, if not more, entrenched in the civic identity of the Taiwanese. However, the exceptional status of the rule of law as established by the British and, arguably, the core of the local identity cannot be observed in Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwanese identity is partially linked to the vision of an independent state under a different name than the current Republic of China. This adds strong political or ideological layers to the civic identity and effectively splits the public along lines of pro-unification with China, pro-Taiwan independence and pro-status quo.16
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This extra option of de-jure independence is significantly different from the Hong Kong situation, because the former colony never had any say in its future. Yet no matter whether aiming to establish an independent state under the name of Taiwan or defending the ROC’s sovereignty and de-facto independence, the Taiwanese have strong emotional ties to their nation. The existence of a de-facto independent state with its democratic institutions is crucial for the strength of the civic identity of Taiwan.Taiwan’s civic identity thus does not only include values related to democracy,freedom and political participation but also the experiences of successful democratic struggle and nationhood. These provide an additional tier to Taiwan’s national identity which Hong Kong does not have. |
發表於 2016-2-23 12:12 AM
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TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。) I1 g8 c& F% r/ P O9 T9 p5 O' B" a
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