[時事討論] 寧贈寃家,不予家奴孔捷生

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2011-2-10 06:54 AM 編輯

寧贈寃家,不予家奴  孔捷生5.39.217.76# V" [5 B8 Y+ B4 V6 l

埃及親美的穆巴拉克遭民眾唾棄,美國也出聲「勸退」,哪似北韓傳璽給第三代嫡孫,天朝既不顧啼饑號寒的北韓人民之感受,也不怕「嚴重傷害中國人民的民族感情」,硬是派政治局常委去朝賀。蘇聯東歐共產陣營已潰滅多年,北京至今未泯依依之情;其間東歐僅得兩個獨裁者下令向民眾開槍,羅馬尼亞壽西斯古反遭槍決,已化為朽骨,東德昂立克被審判下獄,北京至今不出惡聲。卻不知為何,中共在世界上就是沒有盟友,就連北韓金家政權也馴養不熟。
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不過,北京打造了一個利益共同體,它居然是美國,不管關係如何奇特,中美確係一對歡喜寃家。八十年代中美蜜月期,列根總統名言句曰:「共產黨有好壞之分,中共是好的共產黨。」美國資金技術大舉援華,連解放軍米格戰機也分批送到美國,由美方幫助安裝電子設備。六四後蜜月期嘎然中止, 尚未改裝完畢的中國戰機全部停工,中方索還飛機時,美方毫不客氣地收取飛機庫費用。
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殊不知鄧小平南巡之後,中國特色國家資本主義的昌榮,令美國財團和華爾街資本從中國低工資、低地價、低人權、低環保的高速發展中攫取巨大收益,那些廉價血汗產品源源不斷湧入美國,雖加速美國製造業空心化,卻可使卯吃
寅糧的美國人生活質量並無下降,大家缺乏危機感,直至金融海嘯爆發,才驚覺美國經濟金融出了大問題。這時中國動輒數百億美元的大定單又陸續送到,美國越來' o/ @  r+ l) O/ H; B. r; K6 U
越和中國唇齒相依了。
天朝一邊堅決對抗西方價值,一邊不惜損害本國百姓,對西方特別是美國作利益輸送,從而把中美經濟嫁接為奇異的利益共同體。如胡錦濤最近訪美所言,美國在華企業賺錢的超過七成,其高盈利低風險遠勝於美國本土。美國財團和中國權貴資本坐地分肥,得不到合理分配的是中國老百姓。埃及革命的起因是貪腐嚴重,貧富不均,大量貧民每天僅得二至四美元收入。可知中國政府新近劃定的貧窮線是年收入一千五百元人民幣,折合一天約半美元,倘若按世界銀行劃出的每天二美元的貧窮線標準,中國有幾多貧民?tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb( C, e! V! c  i( }$ `

這種天朝發展模式及其價值正在向世界擴張。僅舉一個花絮,這次胡奧峯會之前,美方洽商懇請執政八年多未開過記者會的胡錦濤和奧巴馬一起回答記者提問,中方勉強應承,條件是只能回答四個問題,新華社記者分去一半,剩下兩個記者的提問也要事先報給中方「政審」,美方居然同意。這就是中國特色向世界挺進之一例。當然首當其衝是香港,這座過去依賴自由經濟而繁榮的國際商埠,忽然發現依傍大陸權貴而坐地分肥,錢賺的更快更易更多。香港八十後變為憤怒青年,亦因找不到社會公平,看不到人生出路。5.39.217.76$ P6 f8 q" x8 I, T
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感慨之餘,念及去年春筆者寫過一首《世博》:「鎦銀斛斗量脂膏,肯為蒼生拔一毛?寧向海涯輸玉帛,更教黎庶仰風騷。東吳粉黛魚沉澗,戈壁草泥馬卧槽。從此諸蠻賓上國,紛紛降漢不降曹。」(註:世博會中國館為古代量具斛斗造型。)驀然回首,彷彿一語成讖!TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。( w( g& A3 G6 e5 r( Y$ R3 Y0 @) Z
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felicity2010

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本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2011-2-10 07:02 AM 編輯

Islamists and the Egyptian revolution
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Hossam Tammam
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Any discussion of the status of Islamists in a new Egypt makes little sense if it’s based on the same data that was previously used to study religious movements, and if it ignores the fact that Egypt has witnessed a revolution that destroyed many of the old features of its religious scene.tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb+ H9 ^. L( T5 c. M" w
The revolution was not just directed against the autocratic, repressive and corrupt Egyptian regime, which relied on an alliance of money, power and corruption. It was also directed against the official religious establishment and its discourse that supports this regime, either directly or indirectly.5.39.217.763 P( C9 D3 j+ L) \
The Egyptian revolution has completely reconfigured the religious scene and clarified the public’s position towards religious institutions and discourses in the country. The result has been surprising. No one expected that religious Egyptians are capable of overriding the powers of religious institutions and of challenging religious discourses that they suddenly perceived as part of a corrupt and repressive regime.公仔箱論壇7 L. U/ V) g1 c0 r5 _& ^9 A
The official religious establishments--both Islamic and Christian--have been the biggest losers in the revolution. Al-Azhar was late in addressing the situation. Ahmed al-Tayyib, the Grand Sheikh, waited a long time before making statements that departed from his unequivocal support for the regime. But these statements did not measure up to the revolution. As an official religious institution that is wholly connected to the state--structurally and financially--Al-Azhar did not change its discourse very much after the revolution.. E9 v, U& K! }$ ~8 \7 z& l* Z
Al-Azhar called for calm when the revolution reached its peak. It rejected Egyptian “in-fighting”--ignoring that what happened was a shameful attack orchestrated by the regime with the help of criminals and thugs. Al-Azhar issued vague statements about the need to end the revolution, but made no mention of the regime. Al-Azhar’s only redeeming stance was to invite youth activists for a dialogue. Also, Al-Azhar’s official spokesperson Mohammed Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, submitted his resignation and allied himself with the protesters and several preachers joined the protesters in their unique attire.+ y" |) I$ U8 g  ^  y  Y- r' g
For its part, the Grand Mufti’s Office did everything possible to provide a religious cover for the regime. Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa issued an edict on the“Friday of Departure” (February 4) barring Muslims from praying in mosques. TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。' Y. S& G8 ^4 J) D& Y! v. {# `
Fourteen days into the revolution, it has become clear that the public has paid little attention to the Islamic religious establishment. Aware that Gomaa’s edicts are politically motivated (like his earlier pronouncements that youth who die while emigrating illegally are committing suicide and cannot be considered martyrs), protesters ignored Gomaa’s words.
The position of the most prominent Christian religious institution, the Coptic Church, has been the most blatantly biased toward the regime. Pope Shenouda opposed the 25 January protests and called on Copts not to participate. He maintained this position throughout the revolution, openly declaring his support for Mubarak. Many Copts still took to the streets,refusing to abide by the Pope’s directives. The revolution came as Copts had been mounting the biggest challenge of the Church and its monopoly over there presentation of Egypt’s Christians.  Tens of articles were being written over the last few months arguing that Christian voices must be heard outside the Church, in political parties and programs. The participation of Christians, especially Christian youth, in these protests constitutes another revolution--one that is directed against the Church that has used a sectarian discourse to isolate Copts from the street and to rally Christians behind Mubarak’s regime on grounds that itoffers guarantees to the Christian community.
Much like the Egyptian people succeeded in overriding state-supported religious institutions, they have also succeeded in overriding Salafi groups that were clearly supportive of the regime. Many salafis opposed the revolution and the principle of political opposition more broadly, which the regime tried to use to its favor. Salafis unanimously boycotted the revolution, claiming it was sedition. They accepted decades of injustice, but rejected the revolution.The revolution revealed an unintended alliance between the Mubarak regime and the Salafi movement. On the one hand, this movement is backed by elements in Saudi  Arabia. On the other hand, its members are periodically subjected to harassment by the regime. However, the regime does not see this as completely eliminating its alliance with the movement, as long as the movement continues to support the regime politically.
One of the paradoxes of the Egyptian revolution is that a regime that had just recently banned Salafi TV channels and accused them of inciting sectarian conflict reversed its position and employed Salafi sheikhs in its war against the revolution. This time, Salafi sheikhs and figures, such as Mohammed Hassan,Mahmoud Al-Masri, Mostafa al-Adawi, appeared on state television and private channels close to the regime. They called for an end to protests, using arguments about security and the dangers of sedition. Some went as far as questioning the patriotism of those who instigated the revolution, arguing that it was an American-Zionist conspiracy or akin to the Iranian revolution. The manipulative statements of Iranian leaders in support of the Egyptian uprising further contributed to the Salafi counterattack.
The position of Salafis toward the Egyptian revolution comes as no surprise,especially as they have a history of supporting the regime. The famous Salafi edict to kill prominent reform advocate Mohammed El Baradei is proof. The same sheikh issued an edict banning nominations against President Mubarak in the2005 presidential elections on grounds that Mubarak was the commander of the faithful. What’s surprising, however, is the position of Salafis in Alexandria.This school is among the most independent from the regime and has sometimes even opposed it. Its members have been subjected to tight security measures and arrest campaigns. These campaigns peaked following the attack on the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on New Year ’s Eve. Hundreds of Salafis were arrested and one died as a result of torture.Despite this, the Salafs in Alexandria(and across various other governorates) opposed the revolution, going as far as closing down some mosques on the “Friday of Departure.” They stoked fears about the threat other political currents--a possible reference to El Baradei’s National Association for Change--posed to the Islamic identity.
Salafis are the strongest source of religious support--direct and indirect--for the regime at the moment. But this means the future of the Salafi movement is on the line. On the one hand, the revolution’s triumph over the Salafi movement might lead Salafis to revise their positions. On the other hand, if the revolution is unable to achieve its democratic aspirations, the Salafi movement may reassert its old position with the backing of the regime.8 H" |: i6 J# ~' H8 N2 z2 y0 D- Z
Surely, this analysis includes a great deal of generalization with regards to the Salafi movement. The fact that the Salafi movement was generally opposed to the revolution and allied with the regime does not mean that there were no Salafi voices in favor of revolution. Some voices have taken a progressive stance against the regime, perhaps even more radical than many liberals and leftists. This was particularly true of the Islah Party project, advocated by Salafi politicians like Gamal Sultan in the late 1990s.+ R# y6 F  T  Z6 h1 L1 _9 m- j2 d8 g
The rest of the political forces comprising the Islamist current are divided into armed Jihadi groups that fought against the regime for decades before renouncing violence, and peaceful groups, most prominently the Muslim Brotherhood.
With the exception of a statement by Jihadi leaders Abud and Tarik Al-Zumurin support of the revolution, Al-Jamaat Al-Islamiya and the rest of the Jihadis that renounced violence called for the end of the revolution. Al-Jamaat refused to bring down Mubarak and expressed its satisfaction with his intention not toseek another term in office. Al-Jamaat leaders also insisted on the group’s participation in any political dialogue, even though it had not participated in the revolution. The regime immediately accepted Al-Jamaat’s request. This can be seen as part of the regime’s strategy to include many different political forces in a dialogue to discuss demands that are not those of the revolution.
For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood, continues to participate in protests and has not yet pulled out. Despite this, however, there was a significant shift in the Brotherhood’s position in the past few days after the group agreed to participate in a national dialogue with Mubarak is still in power. This effectively means the Brotherhood has conceded on its demand for the president’s immediate departure, and that it has entered into a dialogue in accordance with the regime’s conditions.
Many harbor the usual doubts that the Brotherhood remains close to the regime, even as it revolts on the street. There are always great pressures governing the Brotherhood’s relationship to the state, most notably its desire to become a legal political movement. There is also a desire to translate the gains of the revolution into tangible improvements in the Brotherhood’s political and legal standing, both domestically and abroad, especially after the movement was invited to join the national dialogue as any other legal political party.5.39.217.769 [5 r7 b! i! f( {
Many in the Brotherhood seem to be acting with a pre-revolutionary mentality, as if no revolution has taken place and as if the regime is still strong. They are failing to ask themselves whether they should fully embrace the demands of the revolution. This is a problem, for it sets limits on what the revolution can achieve rather than thinking about the possibilities that it offers.

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[時事討論] 寧贈寃家,不予家奴 孔捷生

[時事討論] 寧贈寃家,不予家奴孔捷生