公仔箱論壇 - Powered by Discuz! Board

標題: [時事討論] Chris Patten: The Closing of the Academic Mind [打印本頁]

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-23 12:12 AM 標題: Chris Patten: The Closing of the Academic Mind

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2016-2-23 12:17 AM 編輯 公仔箱論壇7 J' b# K2 y4 B; |" n4 H
" `+ K$ M% ^9 f
Chris Patten: The Closing of the Academic Mind

LONDON – I would wager that I have been Chancellor of more universities than anyone alive today. This is partly because when I was Governor of Hong Kong, I was made Chancellor of every university in the city. I protested that it would surely be better for the universities to choose their own constitutional heads. But the universities would not allow me to resign gracefully. So for five years I enjoyed the experience of giving tens of thousands of students their degrees and watching what this rite of passage meant for them and their families.
0 W8 T% Q0 [7 N- d2 g
When I came back to Britain in 1997, I was asked to become Chancellor of Newcastle University. Then, in 2003, I was elected Chancellor by the graduates of Oxford University, one of the world’s greatest institutions of learning. So it should not be surprising that I have strong views about what it means to be a university and to teach, do research,or study at one.3 m! W5 b" I! m, f% [0 t

Universities should be bastions of freedom in any society. They should be free from government interference in their primary purposes of research and teaching; and they should control their own academic governance. I do not believe it is possible for a university to become or remain a world-class institution if these conditions do not exist.* x1 K5 e# |6 C1 r

The role of a university is to promote the clash of ideas, to test the results of research with other scholars, and to impart new knowledge to students. Freedom of speech is thus fundamental to what universities are, enabling them to sustain a sense of common humanity and uphold the mutual tolerance and understanding that underpin any free society. That, of course, makes universities dangerous to authoritarian governments, which seek to stifle the ability to raise and attempt to answer difficult questions.
公仔箱論壇  V( L* W4 g' ~7 T% X
But if any denial of academic liberty is a blow struck against the meaning of a university, the irony today is that some of the most worrying attacks on these values have been coming from inside universities.! d# z/ `5 T7 F( {+ u' w

In the United States and the United Kingdom,some students and teachers now seek to constrain argument and debate. They contend that people should not be exposed to ideas with which they strongly disagree. Moreover, they argue that history should be rewritten to expunge the names (though not the endowments) of those who fail to pass today’s tests of political correctness. Thomas Jefferson and Cecil Rhodes, among others, have been targeted. And how would Churchill and Washington fare if the same tests were applied to them?
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb. ^+ N; f. [* c
Some people are being denied the chance to speak as well – so-called “no platforming”, in the awful jargon of some clearly not very literate campuses. There are calls for “safe spaces” where students can be protected from anything that assaults their sense of what is moral and appropriate. This reflects and inevitably nurtures a harmful politics of victimization – defining one’s own identity (and thus one’s interests) in opposition to others.

When I was a student 50 years ago, my principal teacher was a leading Marxist historian and former member of the Communist Party. The British security services were deeply suspicious of him.He was a great historian and teacher, but these days I might be encouraged to think that he had threatened my “safe space.” In fact, he made me a great deal better informed, more open to discussion of ideas that challenged my own, more capable of distinguishing between an argument and a quarrel, and more prepared to think for myself.

Of course, some ideas – incitement of racial hatred, gender hostility, or political violence – are anathema in every free society. Liberty requires some limits (decided freely by democratic argument under the rule of law) in order to exist.公仔箱論壇4 [$ H! a% z) N: ~
5.39.217.76( `) R7 S# O% M
Universities should be trusted to exercise that degree of control themselves. But intolerance of debate, of discussion,and of particular branches of scholarship should never be tolerated. As thegreat political philosopher Karl Popper taught us, the only thing we should be intolerant of is intolerance itself. That is especially true at universities.
9 m- y  S6 U* r, C# j
Yet some American and British academics and students are themselves undermining freedom; paradoxically, they have the liberty to do so. Meanwhile, universities in China and Hong Kong are faced with threats to their autonomy and freedom, not from within, but from an authoritarian government.

In Hong Kong, the autonomy of universities and free speech itself, guaranteed in the city’s Basic Law and the 50-yeartreaty between Britain and China on the city’s status, are under threat. The rationale seems to be that, because students strongly supported the pro-democracy protests in 2014, the universities where they study should be brought to heel. So the city’s government blunders away, stirring up trouble,clearly on the orders of the government in Beijing.TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。0 b* y2 m( w" _0 {" ^
4 g! a: l, s5 \
Indeed, the Chinese authorities only recently showed what they think of treaty obligations and of the “golden age” of Sino-British relations (much advertised by British ministers), by abducting a British citizen (and four other Hong Kong residents) on the city’s streets. The five were publishing books that exposed some of the dirty secrets of China’s leaders.

On the mainland, the Chinese Communist Party has launched the biggest crackdown on universities since the aftermath of the killings in Tiananmen Square in 1989. There is to be no discussion of so-called Western values in China’s universities. Only Marxism can be taught. Did no one tell President Xi Jinping and his Politburo colleagues where Karl Marx came from? The trouble these days is precisely that they know little about Marx but a lot about Lenin.公仔箱論壇) ?& w9 K4 J3 h  H1 _% [- t, o

Westerners should take a closer interest in what is happening in China’s universities and what that tells us about the real values underpinning scholarship, teaching, and the academy. Compare and contrast, as students are asked to do.
公仔箱論壇+ k% l  P* |; S0 ^! ]3 f* ?1 z
Do you want universities where the government decides what it is allegedly safe for you to learn and discuss?Or do you want universities that regard the idea of a “safe space” – in terms of closing down debate in case it offends someone – as an oxymoron in an academic setting? Western students should think occasionally about their counterparts in Hong Kong and China who must fight for freedoms that they take for granted – and too often abuse.5.39.217.76* @5 o# j* ?, z
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。; e5 ~; d/ v$ R5 Z( U$ ^

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-23 12:23 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2016-2-23 12:26 AM 編輯
- W' t7 J+ f4 z: ^2 t
學生公投促廢特首任校監　中大校長沈祖堯籲弄清不滿對象：針對人還是制度？　公仔箱論壇) Z- K( k" @- w3 }7 Q4 o

5.39.217.76, x" h1 u1 o9 y7 ^' A8 q% V
中大校董會下午舉行諮詢會，商討新一任校董會主席的人選。校長沈祖堯、三十多名校董和數十名師生代表均有出席會議。對於學生會早前舉行公投，大比數要求廢除特首校監必然制度，沈祖堯表明留意到公投結果，但呼籲大家弄清楚是對制度還是對有關人士不滿。& a$ N& m# u$ O2 m

早前中大學生會亦應否廢除特首校監必然制度進行公投，結果近85%人贊成廢除制度。另一議案建議中大校董會增加民選委員的比例，亦獲得88%人支持。學生會會長王澄峰在今日的諮詢會中，提出了上述的公投結果，要求校方回應。5.39.217.762 `* p2 a& T4 T  r' @4 ~2 W3 L. d! n
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb/ M6 N! S$ J& Q: v- i1 K
中大教師協會主席陳竟明則表示，新任校董會主席不應太「政治化」，不應代表政府打壓學生，應保留院校自主的空間。陳竟明又建議新任主席應在校董會中擔任委員至少有一年時間，以確保人選對中大的運作有一定認識，又認為校董會應設有至少一名民選的老師代表。' I- J& n, `! W7 J9 _5 [0 O! r

校方無權修例tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb  [" j0 S3 o" ~4 ^2 d0 F8 D
中大校長沈祖堯在會後表示，留意到學生會進行了公投，認為這代表了一部分學生的意見。另外教職員亦於下月舉行八大院校公投，相信意見亦有代表性。不過沈祖堯強調無論是大學教職員或校董，都無賦予能力去改變法例，因此需要議員帶入立法會向政府提出修改。他認為大學能收集更多內部意見，讓社會有更多討論。
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb9 I( h& d3 p* r; Q$ i/ b
沈祖堯又指，希望大家分清楚究竟是對制度不滿，抑或只是對有關人士不滿，並反問如果是對現況不滿意，就希望改變制度，是否可以解決問題。TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。3 [4 x9 l3 U; a0 p2 [! q4 g( Y$ Q
  l8 |. p3 Z! C- h! V$ A+ B
中大學生會及後在Facebook上表示，在會後向校董會成員之一梁乃鵬致送了一罐「涼粉」，暗諷對方是「梁粉」，又強調學生會將繼續監察校董會成員的舉動，要求校方重視早前公投的意願。TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。& q0 r: a6 y* H( p9 [: {, U* }5 s& f# i+ O
% B( I1 j! ?( L3 }1 A
相關報道：香港電台／商業電台／蘋果日報公仔箱論壇  X6 i( S5 o: K3 I- K; s
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。) q6 [5 U2 `# K$ v8 Y/ b8 @! F
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。9 m& r" f' o* {6 _# ~

科大校長：對修訂大學條例持開放態度　會參考八大院校公投

陳繁昌（now新聞台片段截圖）公仔箱論壇6 d! w4 e. d6 ^0 a7 u
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb% B. G. u  D! C2 c9 m% R
梁振英政府接連委任「梁粉」入主大專校院的校董、校委會，令社會關注特首委任校董及校委的權力；科大校長陳繁昌表示，世上沒有完美的學校制度，又指大學管治架構非常重要，不應輕言改變，但自己對此持開放態度，認為校方可以討論，而八大院校教職員下月發起院校自主公投，陳繁昌表示會參考公投結果，再決定跟進措施。
公仔箱論壇& u7 v- F7 J% K; {
八大院校教職員代表昨日公布，下月將發起聯合公投，讓教職員就應否取消特首任命校董及校委權力、增加民選師生校董、校委比例等議題表態，公投將於下月21-23日進行。5.39.217.767 v, R" r, V/ e+ c  |
科大今日舉行新春傳媒茶敘。梁振英去年委任被外界視為「梁粉」的廖長城，出任科大校董會主席，曾引發學生示威；今日被問到與廖長城的合作關係時，陳繁昌表示，不清楚廖長城是否「梁粉」，但他與廖均為「科大粉」，雙方合作順利。
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb4 [; \4 v: U# C: E
對於旺角騷亂，陳繁昌則指對流血事件感到痛心，又指對香港長遠發展不是好事；陳繁昌強調，香港的核心價值是非暴力，社會有不同意見屬正常，暴力一定不可以解決問題，只會造成惡性循環。陳繁昌透露，事件中沒有科大學生被拘控。" ?' `% e0 P$ Z* k# j# s& A; a
5.39.217.76! [+ s/ i3 Y1 E% Q7 a+ r* {5 u; o
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb+ V0 o( M  s$ ^  q1 ^6 t* P# z
指涉及複雜法律問題　浸大突叫停檢討大學條例諮詢7 d. Y) I; W4 d7 x( @; I
$ G  |2 G% _1 z* {" e# O

學界近日要求修改《大學條例》、廢除特首任必然校監等聲音不斷，浸會大學本計劃在今年1月至3月，就審視大學條例進行第一輪諮詢，並向全體師生、校友發電郵，邀請他們參與多場校內諮詢會。不過，負責有關工作的專責小組，周一晚向浸大師生、校友發電郵表示，由於諮詢會可能涉「複雜的法律問題」，專責小組前晚在會議上一致通過暫緩舉行諮詢會，等待大學就相關問題徵詢專業法律意見。tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb# C! O; i9 p+ |2 o' i
$ Z# E( ]! J7 ?# @+ n8 l, F
浸會大會審視《香港浸會大學條例》專責小組，周一（1月18日）在網站宣佈，早前公佈的審視《香港浸會大學條例》的諮詢會延期舉行，表示待大學就檢討條例的法律事宜徵詢法律意見後，小組會另行通知諮詢會的舉行日期。
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb T @7 X4 `2 z% B
在專責小組上載網站的會議討論概要中，表示收到不少意見，認為相關諮詢所涉的法律問題可能十分複雜，專責小組因此認為，就相關問題徵詢專業法律意見，是審慎及負責任的做法，因此在前晚在會議上，一致通過暫緩舉行諮詢會：

1. The Task Force discussed the issues concerning the consultation process.It noted that since the release of the consultation paper on the review of the HKBU Ordinance as well as the schedule of the face-to-face consultation meetings to the University community and on the University website, the University has received numerous enquiries and views from stakeholders of the University concerning legal issues pertaining to the current review exercise.9 W0 i5 B0 p' }' m" e. [5 R
2. In view of the possibly complicated legal issues involved, the Task Force considered it prudent and responsible to seek legal advice before proceeding with the aforesaid consultation meetings. It unanimously resolved to postpone the consultation meetings, pending solicitation of legal opinion.5.39.217.768 E/ @# `2 T: a7 [' h. B7 F" F
3. The Task Force will continue to communicate with the University community regarding the outcome of the legal advice and the estimated timing for resumption of the consultation meetings.
# ^& S7 ]: A& L- E6 f5.39.217.76

八大院校教員下月公投　盼立會修大學條例TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。, l* H& e1 {( X# [4 C
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。& o6 \4 F5 D/ Y( G, n; s

5.39.217.76/ I3 ^' F4 u& z0 k% b2 Y' b
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。1 F: g  a& d* r9 \
八大院校的教職員於下月21至23日，破天荒舉辦「院校自主公投」，讓逾2.5萬名職工就應否約束特首校監權力表態。發起團體指，望公投結果可向今年立法會選舉的候選人施壓，在立法會推動修改大學條例。TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。5 f) t$ d3 }6 V3 m. p( \# ?
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。; z$ v4 S# n  V# u: g
八大院校包括港大、中大、理大、城大、浸大、教院、嶺大和科大，公投於3月21至23日舉行，院校的全職教職員可透過電子或在票站投票，就取消特首任命校董或校委會成員權力，以及增加職員、學生代表於校董或校委會比例表態。tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb6 t9 I: @" }# b: o& C% v
" j0 `+ [" f# G0 _# m; A
參與公投的大學教職員代表昨招開記者會。港大民意研究計劃總監鍾庭耀指，就網上投票方面，只有系統會知教職員投了什麼票，而實體票會不記名，不用擔心保密問題。鍾庭耀強調對投票議題中立，也不會評論有關結果。

發起團體之一港大教職員會主席張星煒指，特首梁振英利用大學校監權力，委任李國章為港大校委會主席，認為修改大學條例才可消除干預風險。張星煒表示，希望公投結果可作為立法會推動修改大學條例的民意基礎。5.39.217.763 {  N! X- o4 Q% Y

《明報》引述特首辦透過教育局回覆指，在港作任何形式的所謂「公投」，也是完全沒法律基礎和效力，不會獲承認。

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-23 12:29 AM

嶺大學生包圍校董會　會議終告取消　何君堯斥學生：不可姑息tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb( M. z" P# m" r ^. M
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。8 u/ d, L1 [$ I( Y6 I* N2 S

嶺大校董會原訂今午開會，約20多名學生到場示威，要求校方檢討特首應然成為校監之制度，並檢視校董會之組成方法，期間一度與保安發生推撞。有校董會成員透露，今日的校董會會議終告取消。嶺大校董何君堯在Facebook批評，指無理阻撓開會的行為是不可姑息。5.39.217.768 B" t1 s, ?$ h8 T1 r; K/ [% c

嶺大學生會今日發起了示威行動，他們不滿校方曾親口同意成立專責委員會，檢視校董會之組成及特首必然成為校監之制度，但在上次的校董會中卻違反承諾，否決成立專責小組。5.39.217.76- ?' h, }( O& T

約20多名學生下午來到校董會會議場外聚集，校董會主席歐陽伯權及校長鄭國漢到達會場時，一度被學生包圍。歐陽伯權與學生對話時指，已聽到學生的意見，但校董會今日若開不成會，只會阻礙校董會的運作。

不過鄭國漢卻趁歐陽伯權對學生發言期間，經由另一個入口進入會場，部份學生即推倒鐵馬以圖阻止，並與保安人員發生推撞，場面混亂。及後歐陽伯權無法進入會場內，決定乘車離開。5.39.217.761 _+ `' U) w6 \+ t% x
嶺南大學學生會的Facebook專頁引述校董會成員教師代表Peter Baehr表示，今日的校董會流會告終，他相信校董會沒有舉行其他的「秘密會議」。學生會上載的相片又看到，嶺大校園外出現數架警車。
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。; E5 {+ O% Z# ]6 @* d4 G; c" z5 p0 t
何君堯亦在Facebook回應事件，批評有關行為是不可姑息：「一行廿多名校董，原本來到嶺南大學開校董會，遺憾受到一小撮人無理阻撓，會議被迫取消！我認為這些行為是不可姑息的！」
相關報道：香港電台／商業電台／蘋果日報／星島日報

5.39.217.76) j9 L. W) J3 T x: D' _
公仔箱論壇$ N/ x# J2 I0 F1 H$ M( @" J
嶺大校董會否決檢討特首校監應然制　歐陽伯權：沒有迫切性! Q( \5 G1 h4 z/ Y
公仔箱論壇1 H% S9 H# _0 e. P3 x* ?

tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb6 \  W3 b# a8 u7 s6 @
律師會前會長何君堯及反佔中律師陳曼琪，去年獲委任為嶺大校董，兩人今首次出席校董會會議。校董會經過數小時會議後，投票否決成立檢討特首必然出任校監制度的專責小組，但會透過現有的嶺南大學條例檢討委員會，研究校董會的組成比例和校董的產生辦法。tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb/ y  P( ^3 Y" ~) \/ M

嶺南大學學生會於facebook上表示，校董會否決成立專責小組，檢討特首校監應然制。學生會引述校董會主席歐陽伯權指，校董會改革問題沒有迫切性，而近月嶺大負面新聞不斷，校董會應專注提升嶺大教育水準，不應分散資源。另外，《星島日報》引述歐陽伯權指，改善嶺大的學術水準，比檢討校監制度更迫切。  ~: U0 T- j( p7 a8 [+ m! s
; u3 |3 h& l0 A# P2 I
陳曼琪亦發聲明，表明反對修改《嶺南大學條例》及成立專責小組討論特首作為嶺大校監的規定，她認為有關事項乃政治議題，反對大學政治化，「應於立法會處理及討論」。陳的聲明又指，嶺大無權取消特首校監制，認為嶺大應以教研為首，將有限的人力資源聚焦學術發展。

星島日報》引述學生會會長劉振琳表示對結果感到極度失望，認為嶺大有足夠的資源回應學生意願，他又透露，校董會以4票贊成、20票反對、2票棄權、1票廢票、以及1人沒投票，否決成立專責小組。
( T( G( H  D  V/ a9 O- p! N
約10名學生會及嶺大校友關注組成員，今到舉行會議的大樓外請願，要求改革校董會及拒絕由特首擔任校監。有關注組成員於歐陽伯權到場時衝出示威區，被保安攔截，歐陽伯權接收請願信。會議結束後，嶺大校友關注組向正離開的何君堯撒溪錢，惟沒撒中對方。

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-24 09:44 PM

彭定康指北京威脅院校自主　教育局：無中生有

5.39.217.765 e+ E0 f) l& V
前港督彭定康早前撰文指大學院校自主，正受北京干預的極大威脅，又稱校監應由大學選出。教育局今出稿反駁，指由特首出任政府資助大學校監的做法，正是源於彭定康任港督時的決定，指彭定康現提出論點，「是完全罔顧事實的行為」。對於彭定康撰文指香港各大學學生因支持佔領運動，令港府在北京的旨意下，要將大學收編（bring to heel），教育局直指「有關說法毫無事實根據，純屬無中生有」，特區政府深表遺憾。
7 U) w$ [. a$ S$ E8 f
教育局發言人今撰文反駁指，彭定康任港督期間，於1994年會同行政局批准3間學院，即城市理工學院、浸會學院及理工學院升格為大學，同時確立了由總督出任本港所有政府資助大學校監的法定制度，並以法例規定之。而彭定康於餘下任期，未有修改此制度及法例，至香港回歸時，此等制度及法例亦沒廢止。政府重申，特區政府一直致力維護學術自由及院校自主。公仔箱論壇' l( @' z1 o" e" _! f
另外，教育局發言人又原文引用港大校長馬斐森去年底發表的演辭，指馬斐森也認為港大仍有學術自由，但不能有完全的院校自主，因為他們是受公共資助的院校，應當對公眾和代表公眾的政府負責。

彭定康周一於Project Syndicate撰文The Closing of the Academic Mind，指自己可能是世上擔任大學校監次數最多的人，因為他在出任港督期間，自然成為城內各大學的校監；彭定康透露，自己當年曾不滿這項安排，認為應由大學校方自行選出校監，但各院校不容許他辭職。
# y$ z9 |1 Q2 e
彭定康又形容在中國大陸，中共目前正推行大規模的學術自由打壓行動，情況是六四鎮壓後最重手，限制大學教師不可在教授所謂的「西方價值」，只能教授馬克思主義，揶揄習近平政府似乎忘記了馬克思本人來自何方，又指中共對真正的馬克思主義不甚了了，對列寧卻是暸如指掌。9 v l+ p+ a9 Q! q
1 m0 q4 a1 ?$ r8 S3 a
' H! |* C- }3 u8 \; Y
李國章：在會展開校委會避衝突　「舒服得多」tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb) g1 j' F+ g4 e; ]: H# w4 j! Z

tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb: _3 g) f; Z, q9 c# Z
6 [8 T4 p- N: D
港大校委會昨日在會展舉行會議，期間學生代表馮敬恩被逐出會議室。校委會主席李國章今日表示，主動約見新任學生會會長孫曉嵐，正等對方回覆是否願意會面。
無綫新聞報道稱，李國章主動提出要約見孫曉嵐，「是我主動約見他們（學生會），因他們是新上任，大家見面有溝通是非常好，現等他們回覆是否願意會面。聽他們的訴求是甚麼，看如何改善校園。」

被問到下次校委會是否會返回港大校園內舉行，李國章稱下次會議地點有待校方決定。他又解釋在會展開會是希望避免衝突，「因大家都不想有衝突，大家又不是想對抗，我們覺得若在會展召開，會舒服得多，亦方便很多我們的委員。」

校委會於會展開會　花費最少5萬元

另據《明報》報道指，在會展租場開會，最低消費為全日3萬元。不計戴有港大名牌的保安，昨天會展現場的保安約有30名，涉及的費用約為2萬元。由此推斷校委會昨日在會展舉行一次會議，就已花費最少5萬元，全數由港大支付。
公仔箱論壇! K4 y2 J2 Z. v# Y4 C
. }& T+ j6 t4 `$ ~
昨拒簽「確保校委安全」承諾書被逐　馮敬恩：李國章揚言每次開會都會要求　不簽不能開會
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb1 U# I% U* B P6 N s

公仔箱論壇0 R8 x. _2 @1 ]

香港大學校委會昨召開會議，由於學生代表馮敬恩拒絕簽署確保校委和其他人士在會上會後的人身安全承諾書，校委會以大比數投票通過要求馮敬恩離開會議。馮敬恩今日出席商台節目時表示，校委會主席李國章要求他日後每次會議都要簽署該承諾書，否則日後的會議都會被驅逐。

馮敬恩表示，李國章揚言日後每次校委開會，都會要求他簽署同一承諾書，否則不論議程上的項目是否要保密事項，都不可列席，都要離場。5.39.217.76% L1 U7 T/ k# e; X6 j/ ~" n. k4 i
他表示，下次開會如何處理，仍要諮詢法律意見，現在未有決定。但他回應主持時指，短期內無意放同學進入校委會會議，故若單承諾這點並無問題。5.39.217.762 ~: [1 s: O/ _* U6 O: O: v( R
5.39.217.76! | u6 n8 W" t7 ^# V6 G$ E+ t
雖然會上有其他校委質疑，單單要求馮敬恩簽署該承諾書的決定，但李國章僅以“your concern is noted"作回應。公仔箱論壇& W! m; d* y# v9 v+ o$ e. a, E
馮敬恩表示，要求簽署承諾書的議程，是由3名校委提出，馮基於自身能力、承諾字眼含糊，以及施加額外條件不健康，故此拒絕簽署。會上有校委要求不如大家一齊簽安全承諾，但其他人認為，若有其他校委拒簽，莫非也趕走其他校委？
5.39.217.76, t) H& ^& ~) I/ H
蘋果日報今日報道，就要求馮敬恩簽署安全承諾書，校委會花了一個半小時討論，終以13票贊成、5票反對、3票棄權，將馮逐出會議室。討論時校委石禮謙曾指所有校委也應簽署，但遭新任校委周光暉反對。tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb7 [) Z; }. I2 p9 A* t8 a1 ?

tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb# J4 R, H0 i) _9 y6 r3 X
校委張祺忠保溫瓶被疑是竊聽裝置　馮敬恩：紀文鳳要求倒茶驗明真偽' ?: m6 R2 |" p, ^$ J: |) ]
(呢班校委小丑，真喺攪笑攪到國際知名！)8 x" |! @& k; W# ]

5.39.217.76& m5 v9 ~- k' \5 b
港大校委張祺忠昨晚在facebook貼出一張鋼保溫瓶的照片，表示在昨日的校委會中曾被質問，該保溫瓶是否竊聽裝置，學生校委馮敬恩今日在商台節目中指，是校委紀文鳳提出這有趣問題，又指她發問時態度認真，更要求張祺忠從鋼瓶倒茶出來，看看是否真茶，張祺忠當時有這樣做。/ |, S) `8 O: q' m4 T% q

張祺忠昨晚在facebook貼圖時附文，「今天，收了手機後，有人問我，為什麼每次都帶著個鋼保溫瓶，場地不是有茶水供應嗎？這個鋼瓶是不是竊聽裝置？」
紀文鳳在上次校委會因被圍堵，最後以高血壓不適為由召救護車離去。

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-26 07:50 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2016-2-26 07:59 AM 編輯
公仔箱論壇/ E1 H% Y+ R% B, q2 _) w; N
Identity Formation in Taiwan and Hong Kong – How Much Difference, How Many Similarities by Malte Philipp Kaeding公仔箱論壇: H8 g, C1 B! s$ C9 n5 {$ g2 N
1 G" J3 s  A$ h
In:Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: domestic, regional and global perspectives edited by Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm, (2011) Routledge: London,pp. 258-279
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb( k, j" ^. I2 d8 O
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb  @3 G2 A$ E! v. z
Over the past decades, Hong Kong and Taiwan have both developed a unique local or national identity. These have become a subject of great scholarly interest since the 1990s, coinciding with democratization in Taiwan and the handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1997. These political changes have influenced the formation of identities in both areas. Although the individual identities remain strong, they are faced with the challenges of globalization and the consequences of interaction with a powerful China.

Hong Kong and Taiwan serve as excellent examples for a cross case analysis of identity formation in the so-called Greater China area. Both entities share a similar socio-economic background and development, and an authoritarian past that de-emphasized political participation through a strong emphasis on traditional Chinese (political)culture. The issue of identity plays an important role in society and politics,although with different strengths and emphases. The democratic development ofHong Kong and Taiwan and their relations with China offer good opportunities for the comparison of national identity issues in both places.tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb2 c/ \: @* z! A8 `
5.39.217.767 q! A* R! S* c9 c
This article will analyze the formation of the Hong Kong identity, the changes it has undergone and the challenges it faces. The study will reveal similarities to and differences from the development in Taiwan and show to what extent identities are constructed through and based on ethno-cultural and civic identity. Today, the Hong Kong identity has to assert itself against a variety of threats and changes, most notably, rapid integration with the Chinese mainland in economic and,increasingly, in socio-political terms. This paper concludes that the civic part of the Hong Kong identity has remained the most resilient, despite the absence of full democracy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region(HKSAR). The Hong Kong case does provide valuable insights for the Taiwan identity, in times of wide-ranging cooperation with China. Taiwan’s civic identity possesses the additional components of a successful democratic struggle and nationhood and thus will likely prevail in the foreseeable future., O' |, c  S- h5 N) B. E
公仔箱論壇: I& q8 }* R' y
The theoretical framework for this paper is provided by theories of national identity construction, followed by an examination of identity formation in the 2 ethno-cultural and civic realm in Hong Kong. Quantitative studies offer insights into changes in citizens’ identification after 1997. Finally, a comparison with Taiwan looks at the similarities and differences in identity formation in both places.

tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb9 [5 W4 _( f3 Q! @
THEORIES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY5.39.217.767 \' y; m* `3 g8 f
Today, the national identity of Hong Kong as a part of the PRC is unquestionable. However, the majority of the people still identify themselves as either Hong Kongers or Hong Kong Chinese and not as Chinese. The distinct identity that evolved in the city is more than a metropolitan identity, such as, the Shanghainese in China or the New Yorkers in the USA. For more than 150 years, Hong Kong was a separate political entity(Lau 2005). The Hong Kong identity connotes affluence, openness to the world,professionalism and pragmatism and in this it has remained distinct from and to some extent “opposed to Chinese identity with its attachment to a particular tradition, ethnicity, and nationality” (Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 11).

Research on national identity has produced numerous theoretical approaches to this subject. Regarding the definition of origin and nature of national identity, the debate is positioned between essentialist and constructivist approaches. The essential or primordial view of national identity assumes that certain group identities and attachments are given, based on blood, race, language and territory which possess a deep“coerciveness” (Geertz 1963: 259). On the other hand, the constructivist approach to the study of national identity views the nation as an “imagined political community,” stresses its invention and creation and refuses any primordialism (Anderson 1983: 6).

The influential dichotomy in the understanding of the national identity of civic identity versus ethnic or cultural identity is located along these lines. Anthony D. Smith argues that the civic model entails a historic territory, a legal-political community of equal members,articulated in a set of rights and duties and a common civic culture and ideology. On the other hand the ethnic concept emphasizes a community of birth and native culture including vernacular languages, customs and traditions(Smith 1991: 11-12). However, he also acknowledges that most states and nations contain both “civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms”(ibid. 13). Smith’s definition contains a dual notion of culture1–native culture in the ethno-cultural realm and civic culture in the civic realm. Civic culture always includes an element of participation in the political sphere,while native culture can be understood as the experience of day to day life in the neighborhood or at grassroots level. Related to this, is the idea of lifestyles understood as “routines incorporated into habits of dress, eating,modes of acting and favorite milieux for encountering others” (Giddens 1991:81). Borders between the realms of civic and ethno-cultural identity are a matter of degree. When Western (political) values become entrenched in the lifestyle of the population, they can foster the desire to participate and help to develop a civic identity. Anthony Smith’s research on national identity is valuable in the context of this analysis which makes an argument for a unique civic and ethno-cultural identity of the Taiwan and Hong Kong people vis-à-vis the Chinese on the mainland.

# F: G1 N7 F- n* J. D
EVOLUTION OF HONG KONG IDENTITY
In the first decades of the colony, there were few signs of a distinct local identity and one key feature of the Chinese living there prior to the Second World War was, in fact, their “sojourner mentality”: most of them were economic migrants or refugees who intended to return to China after they had made sufficient money for a more comfortable life back home (Tsang 2003: 222). This ended in 1950 when the border to China was effectively closed (Ku 2004: 335). Those born in Hong Kong after 1949 did not have any first-hand experiences of the PRC, until it opened up in the late1970s. Separation from the Chinese mainland for the following decades2 allowed Hong Kong to develop a political culture and an identity of its own (Tsang2003: 223).

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-26 07:50 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2016-2-26 08:12 AM 編輯

ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY
Economic Development One major structural development that provided a great impetus for the advance of a local identity was the transformation of Hong Kong’s economy from an entrepôt economy to a capitalist economy (Lau and Lee 1988: 24). An early attempt to describe an emerging distinct identity was the “Hong Kong Man”; Westernized but Chinese,yet different from British colonizers as well as mainland Chinese (Baker 1983:478). The awareness of the vast socioeconomic differences between the crown colony and the Chinese mainland had developed in a sense of cultural distance or even superiority to the mainland Chinese. The Hong Kong identity has built upon this view of a sophisticated, affluent “us” and a poor, backward “other”(Ku 2002: 356). TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。! ~9 N( z2 D$ ?6 w
' t1 u3 f) r# s
" @* l; @* h, [# P- a
Popular Culture and EducationTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。6 ]& {6 X3 @" k1 h6 w6 j8 T
The importance of the popular culture in the formation of a distinct cultural identity can be explained by the non-interventionist attitude of the colonial government: “In the absence of any hegemonic framework of high culture, national culture, and so forth, popular culture in Hong Kong must play the role – set the agenda – of ‘culture’ per se” (Chan 1994: 449). This culture was transmitted through the popular media (Ma 1999: 23) which was discursively entrenched in Western values. It transformed the Chinese cultural characteristics particular to Hong Kong, articulated local experiences and concerns, crystallized images of a distinct “Hong Kong way of life” (Fung 2004:401) and popularized the term, “Hong Kong person” (Ma 1999: 13). First and foremost, television and film contributed to the articulation of a separate Hong Kong identity where the cultural differences between Hong Kongers and mainland Chinese were particularly emphasized (Ma 2006). Only through this“othering” of the Mainlanders was a distinctive local identity made possible(Ma and Fung 1999: 500). Popular culture was the key force which socialized youngsters to become Hong Kongers, because the Anglicized education system provided little guidance in terms of identity. It taught a depoliticized,culturalist version of Chinese identity and was detached from the local context, with Hong Kong’s own history completely absent from the curriculum(Vickers and Kan 2003: 206). The meager civic education curriculum focused on descriptions of social services and other benefits provided by the colonial administration (Fairbrother 2003) and was largely depoliticized in order to dampen the political consciousness of young people who might otherwise question authority (Leung 1996: 291). The government endorsed the image of the crown colony as an economic city and downplayed the local, civic identity (Vickers2003: 196). 5.39.217.76: U, R4 [' G7 T% m

Western Values and the Market' |5 V( I/ w" J4 J0 K
Studies by Eric Ma and Anthony Fung (2007)illustrated differences in political values between those who identified themselves as Hong Kongers and those who identified themselves as Chinese.Being “Westernized” was identified as a key means of differentiation from China, confirming “that the global or Western element in the Hong Kong identityis a major component that makes it stand out.” Other top values are press freedom and freedom of speech – Western concepts of institutional expression.Furthermore, privacy and equality are ideas concerned with basic individual rights and also cannot be regarded as indigenously Chinese (Fung 2008: 197).According to Anthony Fung, the Hong Kong identity is characterized by local economic values as well as the local consumer culture. Hence the global capitalist culture is a strong component of the local identity (ibid. 193).Global values and culture become a protector of local identity against national intervention from the mainland Chinese side (ibid. 200).
公仔箱論壇5 J7 S- c1 B. \6 D; _3 L# y( e: `; B
The importance of the market for identity construction has inspired the thesis of the “market mentality” of Hong Kong people with regard to their attitude toward national identity (Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008). Accordingly, the emerging local identity was influenced by the rapid socio-economic development of the time. The so-called Hong Kong dream – a bit of luck and hard work, and you can make it – created a market mentality,” and thus many citizens did not subscribe to the idea of “belonging to a nation” as the basis of their lives (ibid. 13). A market-based sense of national identity is characterized by individual choice, and by self-interest paralleling national interest. The “patriotism of the rational” is based on the“individual’s investment of loyalty to the country for his or her own benefit”(ibid. 161).
1 ^' R: h5 d: q$ i2 I

Cultural Memory
The 2003 respiratory disease SARS, and a mass demonstration against the government and the proposed national security law on1 July, marked the appearance of a community spirit embodying greater civic awareness (Yeung 2007) as well as a new surge in social movements, organized not by political parties but a by wide range of grassroots organizations. For the most part, the so-called third and fourth generation of Hong Kongers who were involved in these movements refrain from ideologically motivated actions(Lü2007: 49, 66). The cultural critic, Chan Koon-chung, points to the visceral level at which “locals have an unmistakable sense of their identity and rooted common culture” (Chan 2007: 384). At this level, personal memories are connected to the space and sites of daily life. In Hong Kong, where the culture has been described as a “culture of disappearance”3 (Abbas 1997),identification with the material environment has always been difficult. In Ming K. Chan’s analysis, Hong Kong people were looking for anchors and places of belonging in the decade after 1997, when the local identity came under threat.When reconstructing and affirming their own past as an integral part of the Hong Kong community, this past was expressed through “collective memory construction.” Collective memory construction and movements are often linked to old artefacts, public sites and long existing structures, such as the Star Ferry in Central District (Chan 2008: 18). The heritage conservation movement was therefore tied to concerns about the erasure of a part of Hong Kong’s cultural identity, implying a common destiny and values that have to be preserved (Lo 2007: 436) The importance of heritage preservation for the local identity is further emphasized by the involvement of the late teenage and early twenties generation of Hong Kong youth, which is actively seeking local contexts for identity formation (Cartier 2008: 76). By comparing it to the1960s movements An argues that the Star Ferry protests are a means for the Handover generation to establish an identity of its own, which is intrinsic to the Hong Kong identity (An 2007). Eric Ma echoes this view and sees a new city consciousness surfacing through the struggle over harbor protection,participation in the West Kowloon Cultural District project and the rebuilding of Wan Chai. This indicates an increasing desire for political participation as well as a strengthening of the development of social groups. To be a Hong Kong person means to be actively involved in Hong Kong affairs since a local identity can only be created through the continuous recreating of Hong Kong society (Ma and Liang 2005) With regard to the basis of the Hong Kong identity,it indicates a paradigm shift in Hong Kong’s local culture. After 1997, the Hong Kong identity based on popular culture became weaker as sinicization and globalization exacted a heavy toll on the uniqueness of the popular culture industry. The new city consciousness might be able to provide a foundation to strengthen a distinctive cultural identity and to position the territory internationally, nationally, regionally and locally (Ma 2006).5.39.217.76# p1 q, F$ ]( i3 e* d, J

5.39.217.76$ [7 w' `- B; C3 E7 O& `0 \+ M% _
CIVIC IDENTITY tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb) D& ~; C. v9 a, \" q* |& I# d
Myth of Political Apathy For a long time,Hong Kong’s political culture was portrayed as being dominated by political apathy and traditional Confucian culture (King 1981, Lau 1981). Identity in the colony was formed by a “fear of politics” (White and Li 1993: 18). Hong Kong was seen as a “lifeboat” offering relative stability, impartial justice, and economic opportunity in the cruel sea of China. Political activities would only create unnecessary conflict and dissent (Hoadley 1970: 211). The parochial and individualistic behavior as well as the political apathy of Hong Kongers were explained by so-called “utilitarianistic familism” – individuals putting their families’ interests and materialistic concerns before the interests of society(Lau 1981: 201). The perceived lack in the sense of community spirit, political involvement, and hence the non-existence of the Western notion of citizenship,justified the denial of democratic self-determination (Turner 1995: 36).Research since the late 1990s has adopted a broader definition for the political participation of Hong Kong people, thus the “myth of political apathy” (DeGolyer and Scott 1996) has largely been refuted. Important acts of political participation, such as strikes, participation in social movements and demonstrations were previously not considered (Lam 2004: 19) and individual political participation at grassroots level as well as the political awareness of Hong Kongers were not included in previous analyses (Lo 1999: 51). 公仔箱論壇1 o) g, h: l+ s) ^( s2 a% z
公仔箱論壇2 ?8 f) R3 N1 H. c3 M% z
5.39.217.766 Y5 ^% l6 o- ?1 ?% z
Political Identity公仔箱論壇& H. X! j0 R9 I0 m9 z
Political events since the 1960s, however, have shown the increasing desire for political participation and articulation, and have contributed in several ways to the establishment of a strong civic Hong
Kong identity. Protests in 1966 marked the emergence of a trend toward local issues being discussed more vigorously in the domestic political arena, put forward by the post-war generation of Hong Kongers (Turner 1995: 26; Mathews, Lui and Ma2008: 32). The 1967 riots, sparked by the Cultural Revolution on the mainland, reinforced the existing Mainlander versus Hong Konger dichotomy,  reaffirming Hong Kong’s culture, governing ideology and way of life (Thomas 1999: 85). 5.39.217.76* \6 i3 P  G0 M% g

In the 1970s, the government reacted to an increasingly vocal social movement (So 1999) by launching a broad program of social and administrative reforms (So 1999; Lam 2004). By the early 1980s, the colonial government had transformed into a modern polity characterized by relative openness, responsiveness, freedom, the Anglo-Saxon concept of the rule of law, the protection of human rights and stability (Hayes1996: 281). When the transfer of sovereignty was decided in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, this had an important consequence for Hong Kong’s identity as a fusion of Western and Chinese influences (Bhattacharya 2005: 51).Hong Kongers hoped for democratization as a means of safeguarding their own way of life under the principle of “one country, two systems.” The call for more political participation was rooted in the promise of self-administration for Hong Kong after 1997 (Cheng 1997: 156) and was also a consequence of the social changes and demands of the 1970s (Yahuda 1996: 57). More than any other event in the modern history of Hong Kong, 1989 Tiananmen massacre forced the territory’s local community to form an opinion as to what constituted their identity (Thomas 1999: 87). The massive demonstrations in support of the students and workers in Beijing created a sense of unity among the Hong Kongers and showed that the people of Hong Kong would respond to a common cause (Yee1989: 231). When substantial democratic reforms were implemented by the last governor, Christopher Patten, they served as a catalyst, improving the political consciousness and democratic aspirations of the Hong Kong people, and further strengthening their civic identity (Lo 2001: 50-53). 5.39.217.76" q; P7 D1 P# M5 E
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb  }% C0 P6 D: i% H. E0 w# M
By the end of the colonial era, the Hong Kong people had developed a strong, distinct identity based on the differences between Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland in economic, cultural and political terms (Chan 2007: 383). This Hong Kong identity could best be understood as“Chineseness plus,” since Hong Kongers are ethnically Chinese and in abstract cultural and historic terms, most of  them feel that they are part of the Chinese nation4 (Mathews 1997: 9). Yet, at the same time, they are different. Their unique way of life, the value pertaining to freedom of expression, the rule of law, transparency, social mobility,responsible government and democracy were, in the last decades, guaranteed and provided by the British rulers. Hence, despite years of propaganda and with Chinese patriotism at a high point, only a slim majority stated that they were happy about the return to China5 (Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 49).

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-26 07:52 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2016-2-26 08:19 AM 編輯
3 k, I% V$ N1 r. w
Civic Values
The analysis has shown that local identity is founded on economic and Western values, which became particularly noticeable after the handover. The severe economic downturn shattered the self-confidence of the Hong Kongers (Zhang 2009). Their feeling of superiority vis-à-vis the mainland, the “Hong Kongism,” was further tested by the failed policies of the Tung Chee-hwa administration. Anthony Cheung suggests that the prime supporter of Hong Kong’s values and its identity was the middle class which was seriously affected by post-handover changes. The Hong Kong identity could, in civic terms, be understood as a set of core values6 that includes civil liberties,the rule of law, respect for human rights, accountable government, democratic institutions, and political pluralism (Cheung 2005: 58). Ensuring certain upward mobility and ever-expanding job and business opportunities are also part of this value package (ibid. 65). Government policies for integration with China were perceived as leading to the increasing dilution of the international character of the city(Cheung 2005). When the basis of the Hong Kong identity was threatened by assimilation through this increasing integration, the people resisted with frequent protests within all sectors of society (Cheung 2007: 89). Anthony Cheung argues for a linkage between the Hong Kong identity, the city’s core values and political participation (Zhang 2000: 38). The emergence of the Civic Party provides a prime example of this connection.7 And obviously, the mass demonstration on 1 July 2003 marked a turning point and politicized the middle class (Zhang 2003: 81). tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb/ N% L4 L- c1 \3 l5 P" j( C
5.39.217.76* p6 ^+ i. }- A7 U$ P& Q3 R6 B4 G
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb' n( ~. {2 q# c- h
Political Rituals and ProtestsTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。' j6 Q3 Z, ^, x1 Q, @0 s) G2 C
The discourse of social and political participation as the foundation of a new emerging Hong Kong identity is based on the idea that unified actions will create a sense of belonging and cultural identification with the city and its people. Popular imagination and the practice and memories of certain similar customs and rituals, such as,participation in replicated events, manifest the cultural identification of the individual with the community. The people’s collectively shared beliefs and faiths are the common substance of this community (Lo 2007: 435). The annual candle-light vigil in memory of the victims of the Tiananmen massacre is a“secular democratic ritual,” constituting a fundamental part of the political culture and political identity of Hong Kong. Participation is a way of showing the conviction that only democracy will maintain the Special Administrative Region (SAR) identity and way of life (Beja 2007: 7, Loh 2007: 40). 1989 was a key moment in the development of political awareness and in the formation of anew political culture. The discourse of June 4 highlights the differences between the Hong Kong identity with its core values and the official Chinese national identity, as the latter includes the refusal to acknowledge the Tiananmen massacre (Beja 2007: 7). In Hong Kong, large scale demonstrations with a couple of thousand or even one hundred thousand participants have always been related to political issues – more precisely, they are usually triggered by the perception that the Hong Kong way of life is under threat (ibid.) as,for example, in the case of the mass demonstration of 1 July 2003. The mismanagement of the SARS epidemic had led to weakened trust in the HKSAR government. The crisis demonstrated that the Hong Kong values of transparency,freedom of expression and information and freedom of the press, were crucial in the battling of the disease, but these were constantly undermined by the government (DeGolyer 2004a). When the bill for a national security law under Article 23 of the Basic Law was launched, the common perception was that the Tung Chee-hwa administration was about to destroy these cherished values.85.39.217.763 }, N7 K0 P' B

More than 500,000 people protested against the government and against Article 23. The demonstration marked a strong rejection of government attitudes that were associated with mainland Chinese politics and it also functioned as a reassurance of the Hong Kong identity for the participants. The demonstrations were a source of pride and thus a resource for the long-term cultivation of local identification (Chan and Chung 2003).Collectively, they were an expression of the fact that the Hong Kong people shared certain values and beliefs (Wu 2003). In 2004, the mass demonstration of1 July was of similar size and asked for the introduction of universal suffrage in 2007/8 which had been rejected by the National People’s Congress in Beijing only months earlier. Hence this movement was a confirmation of the civic Hong Kong identity vis-à-vis the Chinese understanding of national identity (Li2004). The 1 July demonstrations have, since then, become an annual event and part of the collective memory of Hong Kongers and the Hong Kong identity. 公仔箱論壇# ~" j* ], i1 R: ^0 V$ t! b

IDENTITY CHANGES
Several studies have traced the changes in the self-identification of the Hong Kong people. The data used in this article stems from the Hong Kong Transition Project (HKTP) at the Hong Kong Baptist University.The HKTP defines “Chinese” as a patriotic statement and “Hong Kong Chinese” as a regional identity, not stronger than Shanghainese or New Yorker. “Hong Kong person” or “Hong Konger,” however, connotes a separate identity from “Chinese”or “Hong Kong Chinese” (DeGolyer 1997, 15). The principal distinguishing features between the different identity categories are attitudes towards democracy and patriotism (Lau and Lee 1988, 184). To be a “Hong Konger” means to be the most liberal and the most supportive of democracy, and the least supportive of nationalistic values. It also means to put the interests of Hong Kong over those of China (Wong 1998, Lee and Chan 2005).

% M1 Q1 E$ ]  W" i1 I# b# e
TABLE1 HERE5.39.217.76  x1 A/ u% ^- D! Y$ T
In general, the survey data indicates a gradual increase in those holding a “Chinese” or “Hong Kong Chinese” identity.However, “Hong Konger” still remains the identity choice of the majority. More precisely, the HKTP has recorded a slight increase in the Chinese identity category from 20 per cent in 1993 to about 20 per cent throughout the late2000s (23 per cent in May 2009). At the same time, the category “Hong Kong person,” has fallen from an average of 40 per cent plus in 2007 to 38 per cent in spring 2009. The self-description “Hong Kong Chinese,” as a weaker local  identity, experienced a steady rise throughout the transition period from levels of around 30 per cent to up to 35 per cent in May 2009 (DeGolyer 2009). Reasons for these changes can be attributed to the policies of the HKSAR government,which launched a program to promote the patriotism of the citizens and also made accordant changes in the school curricula. Combined with steady immigration from China,9 an impact on the Hong Kong identity can therefore be assumed 10 and a long-term trend towards a rise in the Chinese identity seems likely.公仔箱論壇2 m# M& h5 v# x" n4 v

[attach]3313234[/attach]

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-26 07:52 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2016-2-26 08:35 AM 編輯

HONG KONG AND CHINESE IDENTITY TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。/ A: T( N/ @# f  j+ ?
Hong Kong people identify strongly with a set of Western liberal-democratic core values and therefore with institutions that represent these values, such as the ICAC 11 and the judiciary. Trust in the legislature is, however, low (Wong, Hsiao and Wan 2009) and satisfaction with the government and political parties fluctuates at levels similar to other pluralistic states in East Asia or in Western democracies (ibid., Cheung 2009).The low identification with the political institutions can largely be attributed to their lack of power and un-democratic nature. Surveys have indicated that Hong Kong people have a strong need for a responsive and democratic government and legislature (DeGolyer 2009), a fact which is further emphasized by the frequent mass protests for universal suffrage and by the pro-democracy forces always gaining about sixty per cent of the popular vote.

Although the local cultural identity of the Hong Kong people is strong, it coexists with an abstract identification with a historic and cultural vision of the Chinese nation and Chinese identity. The official perspective of the Beijing regime on national identity, however, sees identification with the Chinese nation as equal to identification with the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Chang 2001). The civic elements of Hong Kong identity stand in clear opposition to this notion of Chinese identity, as the Hong Kong people largely reject the idea of “loving”the CCP or the Communist state.12 This identity clash is further intensified by the fact that the PRC national identity’s strong ethnic and cultural undertones include xenophobic and anti-Western sentiments (Chang 2001: 137, Lo 2008: 174). In fact, Beijing’s understanding of national Chinese culture is a hybrid of Communist state culture and a perceived monolithic national culture (Chan 2007:380).

The ethno-cultural identification of many Hong Kong people with mainland China is blended by the Beijing regime with political identification with the CCP to form a cultural-political Chinese identity (Lo 2008: 171). Accordingly, patriotism is defined through loyalty to the Communist party and the state. In 2004, Xiao Weiyun, a legal expert from Beijing, explained the official definition of un-patriotic behavior: forging close links with (Western) foreign countries, aligning with groups deemed unacceptable to the CCP and questioning the territorial integrity of China(that is, supporting independence for Taiwan) (Xiao 2004). For many Hong Kong people, however, being part of a modern open society is part of their identity,and the pan-democrats promote a Hong Kong style patriotism, including democratic and participatory elements, such as, the fight for democracy and concrete patriotic actions (Situ 2004a: 174). Democrats reject the claim of the CCP to be the only patriotic force, because the party does in fact suppress China’s people, destroying Chinese culture and all those aspects which are cherished because they represent the idea of a Chinese nation (Situ 2004b: 66). They further argue that a liberal democratic expression of the nation is crucial and should be drawn from a sovereign people because the nation is composed of neither government nor party (Chen 2004: 81). $ f- V% w0 e6 S. r% d2 F. R

tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb  k- G5 c$ R) h. ?! H  v0 f" V4 U6 Y
Identity Politics
The new emerging local culture and distinct civic identity of Hong Kong are however threatened by the forces of globalization (Choi 2007, Ma 2006), as well as by Chinese nationalism or sinicization. Nationalism is coming into the Hong Kong context on two levels:in the official discourse and policies of the HKSAR and Beijing governments,and also through integration and interaction at grassroots level. 公仔箱論壇# x) f$ v# G- a+ {) h

For the regime in Beijing, it is impossible to approve of the ideological cohesion of a Hong Kong cultural identity constituted against the mainland Chinese identity. Any manifestation of a separate, independent cultural identity is viewed as a political threat to the regime in Beijing (Lo 2007: 436). Immediately after the handover, the Hong Kong government launched several programs and initiated policies all aimed at bringing about an active change in the creation of a unified Chinese identity.The measures in the educational realm included, for example, changes in the school curriculum. The PRC began to be portrayed in a much more favorable light, with the focus on economic achievements and rising international status(Vickers and Kan 2003). The most controversial measure, however, was the introduction of mother-tongue language teaching at secondary schools.13 English is seen as a form of cultural and symbolic capital that distinguishes Hong Kong from the mainland and thus the government’s policy was taken as an attempt to alter the collective identity (Chan 2002: 283). The government further strengthened the subject “civic education” in schools (Vickers and Kan 2003)and the national song and national flag featured prominently at educational institutions. To boost the general public’s patriotism and identification with the mainland, the government has produced television announcements in the public interest (API) entitled “Our Home, Our Country” since 2004, and everyday before the evening news the Chinese national anthem together with a clip showcasing the achievements and beauty of China and Hong Kong are aired(Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 74). Government Identity Discourses John Flowerdew(2004) has shown how the administration of Tung Chee-hwa stressed the“Chineseness” of Hong Kong, downplayed democratic development and emphasized the sameness of the mainland and the SAR. The economic discourse predominated, displacing the discussion of democratic reform and constitutional development,and trying to depoliticize the city through a discourse on stability and promoting Hong Kong as an economic city (Morris P., Kan and Morris E. 2000).Hong Kong should also be more culturally integrated with China to prevent foreign political and cultural influence, including, most notably, ideas like democracy and human rights, from “subverting” the mainland (Loh and Lai 2007:29). Tung’s old fashioned governing style, traditional Chinese values and ethnic definition of identity were, however, not in tune with the majority of Hong Kongers. When Donald Tsang took over the position of Chief Executive, he chose a more subtle approach, appearing more open to Hong Kong values and identity while maintaining the policies of fostering patriotism and integration with the mainland. The discourse on the so-called “New Hong Konger”demonstrates, however, that Tsang was carrying forward his predecessor’s political mission. In the 2007 policy address, he stated that after 1997, Hong Kongers had been unsure about their identity and the economic prospects vis-à-vis a rising China. According to his analysis, Hong Kong can only prosper as a fully integrated part of the PRC and the HKSAR’s citizens must look at the city’s development “from the perspective of our country’s future” (Policy Address 2007). Critics have argued that by using the slogan, “New Hong Konger,”Tsang was trying to evoke an association with the famous slogan, “New Taiwanese,” which was aimed at reconciling the sub-ethnic conflicts in Taiwan(An 2007). Yet they point out that the Chief Executive, in fact, attempts to downplay local identity, because, for Tsang, Chinese national identity should indeed be equivalent with the “New Hongkonger” identity (Zhang 2007).

Grassroots Nationalism
In addition to the policies and discourses of patriotism shaping and defining Hong Kong identity, rapid interaction with the mainland at grassroots level has created a form of “grassroots nationalism” (Ma2007: 149). The bottom-up discourses on nationalism are re-shaping the national imagination of Hong Kong people by bringing the nation closer to the everyday experience of the general public. The Chinese nation is seen by those Hong Kong people who have frequent interactions on the mainland as “a great national territory, a collective of a great diversity of people, an embodiment of familial networks and a huge consumer market.” These new ideas of the nation could result in the formation of a regional hybrid culture incorporating Hong Kong and Chinese components (ibid. 165). He does not, however, pursue this idea further to explain how this new cultural identity is positioned vis-à-vis the civic identity of Hong Kong. 公仔箱論壇: S9 u2 p" w3 i& R1 B" e
公仔箱論壇. r/ U# H! ]  ?2 s  [" g
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb) o* f/ d4 Z; h
EVOLUTION OF TAIWAN IDENTITY5.39.217.769 B7 h8 k  U- {' K! E
The notion of a unique Taiwan identity is closely connected with the island’s history. Taiwan was ruled by the Dutch(1624-1661), became part of the Chinese Qing Empire (1683-1895) and eventually a Japanese colony (1895-1945), before the administration of the island was taken over by the Republic of China (ROC) (Cabestan 2005: 32). The “February 28Incident” of 1947 marked the affirmation of a unique Taiwanese identity and created a demand for autonomy and democracy (Chu and Lin 2001: 123). In 1949,with the KMT forces’ to Taiwan, a sub-ethnic cleavage emerged between those who had newly arrived from the Chinese mainland and the Taiwanese – Han-Chinese who had been living in Taiwan for several centuries before 1945. For several decades, the Taiwanese were completely excluded from political participation and power in the higher levels of the institutions. The local culture and language were suppressed because the KMT was intent on propagating its official“great China” nationalism (Schubert 1999: 54). When cautious political liberalization began in the 1970s, the Taiwanese national identity arose and was expressed in native literature which, closely linked with the growing political opposition, called for democracy and participation (Hsiau 2000: 91).With democratization in the late 1980s, the idea of Taiwanization became increasingly prominent; among its aims were to achieve the political and cultural equality of the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the ruling Mainlanders and the KMT brand of Chinese nationalism. Policies under the presidencies of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have contributed to the sharp increase in Taiwan identity.14* y8 B0 y8 ?( P6 b% H% W+ O4 \

Theoretically, the discussion on Taiwanese identity can be divided into three basic discourses (Schubert 1999). Taiwanese ethno-cultural nationalism states that the Taiwan identity is based on specific historical experiences and perceived cultural differences between the Taiwan people and the mainland Chinese; the focus is on the colonial past of the island and its long separation from the China (Schubert 1999: 55). In the multi-ethnic nationalism approach, the Taiwanese nation is conceptualized as a harmonious, democratic and tolerant nation of four ethnic groups, the Mainlanders,the Hoklo, the Hakka, and the aborigines (Zhang 2002). According to political or state nationalism, the foundation of a Taiwan nation is in line with the institutions of a liberal state. The rise of the Taiwan identity is seen as directly connected to its geographical and political separation from China and its subsequent democratic development (Cabestan 2005, Schubert 2004).
公仔箱論壇) \6 z5 U9 r0 X& |- b; Q

HONG KONG AND TAIWAN IDENTITIES
If Smith’s framework of national identity based on ethno-cultural and civic components is applied to the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan, a series of similarities and differences is revealed. For along time, both identities were portrayed as rooted in an envisioned homogenous Chinese race and common ancestry. While in Hong Kong, this ethnic element of identity remains strong, in Taiwan, there have long been intense discussions on multiculturalism and ethnic diversity although the idea of an ethnic Taiwanese nationalism has prevailed in some circles of society. Although traditional Chinese culture with its festivals and folklore are dominant in both societies,Hong Kong and Taiwan have both developed cultural identities different to that on the CCP-ruled mainland. In the economic realm, decades of economic boom in Taiwan and Hong Kong, starting in the 1960s and lasting until the 1990s,created affluent societies and generated a sense of pride in these achievements. Hence differentiation through wealth and sophistication from the,at that time, backward PRC prevailed during the first encounters with the mainland in the 1970s and 1980s. Local culture and localism were regarded as cornerstones of an emerging exceptional culture, different not only from the present day mainland way of life, but also from traditional Chinese culture.Hong Kong’s cultural uniqueness was based on a newly developed popular culture and focus on local affairs using the Cantonese language. In Taiwan, the cultural identity also possesses links to modern popular culture, but the identity is dominated by native Taiwanese culture and language which were suppressed in the first decades of KMT rule. Ideas of multiculturalism are common in Taiwan, with its several Chinese sub-ethnicities and the aborigines. Interestingly,these ideas have never been given much attention in Hong Kong, despite its international city image, its strong Indian community and its global workforce.The reason for this is the perception that Hong Kong is a predominantly Chinese society, so that the idea of a distinct hybrid culture functions as“demarcation and territorialization and carves out a distinct subject position for Hong Kong local Chinese only” (Lo 2007: 436). 15tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb$ E+ k2 A+ O' l0 _9 X1 D
tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb$ x1 w# l5 P6 f8 B. |( C9 [  i' O
Scholars have argued that the pillar of the distinct identities in both cases is the civic realm of national identity(Mathews 1997, Schubert 2004). During the colonial era, the rule of law, civil liberties, human rights, a free and vibrant press and a responsive government were all things in which Hong Kong citizens felt immense pride. With regard to personal freedoms and institutional guarantees, the city was much more a part of the Western world than of China. Political participation and the desire for democratization became an increasingly important part of the Hong Kong identity after the 1980s. The political reforms of the last governor, Chris Patten,responded to these demands with the result that Hong Kong core values became further entrenched in Hong Kong society. Hong Kong people, since then, have defended their civic identity against real and perceived threats from the government. Surveys have consistently indicated that although, generally,identification with the Chinese is slowly increasing, Hong Kong people still feel distant from China in political and civic terms. This is confirmed by the solid support given to political parties and organizations that stand for Hong Kong’s core values and further democratization, as well as by the high attendance in related political campaigns and rallies.
! Q$ u3 |8 X7 a. e1 c3 T3 p$ ]2 i
Within the civic identity of the Taiwanese,the desire for democracy and the equality of the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the Mainlanders are closely connected. In the authoritarian era of KMT rule, the opposition saw the practice of democracy and the democratization of institutions as the only way of achieving truly equal opportunities for all the citizens of Taiwan. The civic identity of the Taiwanese was formed through the struggle of the opposition movement for representation and the democratic transformation of the KMT government. The experience of a successful and peaceful democratic transition is a matter of great pride for the Taiwanese.Compared with Hong Kong, civil liberties and democratic values, as well as group mobilization and cohesion, are equally, if not more, entrenched in the civic identity of the Taiwanese. However, the exceptional status of the rule of law as established by the British and, arguably, the core of the local identity cannot be observed in Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwanese identity is partially linked to the vision of an independent state under a different name than the current Republic of China. This adds strong political or ideological layers to the civic identity and effectively splits the public along lines of pro-unification with China, pro-Taiwan independence and pro-status quo.16
5.39.217.76( ?8 t; e8 j! n( S
This extra option of de-jure independence is significantly different from the Hong Kong situation, because the former colony never had any say in its future. Yet no matter whether aiming to establish an independent state under the name of Taiwan or defending the ROC’s sovereignty and de-facto independence, the Taiwanese have strong emotional ties to their nation. The existence of a de-facto independent state with its democratic institutions is crucial for the strength of the civic identity of Taiwan.Taiwan’s civic identity thus does not only include values related to democracy,freedom and political participation but also the experiences of successful democratic struggle and nationhood. These provide an additional tier to Taiwan’s national identity which Hong Kong does not have.

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-26 07:53 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2016-2-26 08:38 AM 編輯 : ~5 g: d; _, z
公仔箱論壇8 }2 D3 M# t7 ^2 I1 S
CONCLUSION公仔箱論壇, k. }6 G; I- K- s2 E/ q6 r
Since the late 1990s, Taiwan and Hong Kong have been facing the challenge of a rising China rapidly gaining economic and political influence. The Beijing government regards the unique identities and democratic aspirations of the Hong Kong and Taiwan people as a danger to itsidea of a uniform Chinese identity. China’s strategies of identity politics and economic penetration, in particular, pose a significant threat to Hong Kong and Taiwan identities (Wu 2007: 298). ; g2 T5 G" U8 ?

A study of the formation of the Hong Kong identity reveals that the local identity developed in relation to an “opposite other,” the Chinese mainland. The concept of “Chineseness plus” as the Hong Kong identity has gradually emerged and this is based on ethno-cultural and civic identity components, demonstrating a superiority over or difference from China which is perceived in terms of economic achievements, cultural sophistication and democratic values. When Hong Kong’s edge over the PRC was weakened by government policies and rapid integration with the mainland, the citizens reacted in several ways. In the cultural sphere, a new city consciousness has been emerging, revitalizing a unique local cultural identity.When people felt that their core values were being undermined by the government, they reacted swiftly. Massive demonstrations and refreshed social and democratic movements have highlighted the strength of Hong Kong’s civic identity. It can be argued that the civic identity is the cornerstone of Hong Kong’s resilient identity. The values of a civic identity are firmly entrenched in the collective memory of the city and hence might be able to resist patriotic education, nationalistic propaganda and the potential “grassroots nationalism” resulting from interaction and integration with the mainland. The fact that on the 20th anniversary of the 4 June massacre, more than 150.000people gathered for the annual candle-light vigil, among them great numbers of students and youngsters not born when the events took place, seems to support this argument (Leung and Wu 2009).
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。; P- V% \1 ?, [, Y! d
Taiwan, like Hong Kong, is faced with the option of further economic integration with the mainland. Since the Ma Ying-jeou administration took over in May 2008, cooperation with the PRC has taken off at an unprecedented speed and depth. While the majority of the Taiwanese support constructive cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere, this development has created fears that if Taiwan moves too fast towards the mainland, some of its sovereignty could be surrendered to China (Ho2009). The feeling that the new government is threatening Taiwan’s identity,particularly its civic components of democracy and Taiwan sovereignty, has led to several mass demonstrations in late 2008 and 2009. These protests signify the continuing strength of Taiwanese identity and the resistance of a relevant part of society against its possible erosion. Nevertheless, up to now, there have not been any clear indications that any main political party does fundamentally question Taiwan’s civic identity and its core values, such as the island’s sovereignty. Differences among parties appear to be more at the ethno-cultural identity level, with the KMT still committed to some form of a pan-Chinese identity.
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。1 m) X/ p4 ]) v" ?9 P+ }& |# n
Comparing Hong Kong with Taiwan offers interesting insights into the development of the local identities under the concept “one country –two systems.” More than a decade after the handover, the unique Hong Kong identity is still strongly in existence. This means that,within the Chinese nation state, Chinese identity is fragmented. For Taiwan,however, these findings do not have any consequences because “one country –two systems” does not present either a viable option or an alternative to the status quo. Taiwan has not only a unique local identity but, as the Republic of China, it possesses a fully developed national identity and there seems to be very little likelihood that the Taiwanese will relinquish this in the near future.

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2016-2-26 09:38 PM

被紀文鳳質疑暖壺是竊聽器　張祺忠：淨係想笑　係咪傻架tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb3 o( t9 j& g! [$ u+ u

TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。1 N* m6 c& o+ V+ R+ ]( L. E
" Y' E& |* W9 F/ n. B3 j: A
港大校委會周二開會，校委之一紀文鳳懷疑另一校委張祺忠的保溫瓶是竊聽器，張今再回應指「每次開會我斟壺茶來飲，任何與我開會的人都知開會我會倒茶來飲」，被問到有否覺得被冒犯，他指「淨係想笑」，又想「唔係呀嘛，咁你都諗到」，覺得「你係咪傻架？」5.39.217.762 ]1 F( F8 E0 K- j# M! N

張祺忠今早於DBC電台節目稱，去年校委會討論陳文敏的副校長任命時，眾校委已交出手提電話，但仍有錄音流出，所以有校委「疑神疑鬼」，周二開會他被指「無見過你斟來飲，每次（暖水壺）都只是放在這。我心想，不是吧，她話我，我就覺得『你係咪傻架？』」。TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。: F! V8 `# Z( T8 |% t' @

張祺忠指，「我就告訴她，我每次都是斟一壺茶來，每次開會我斟壺茶來飲，任何與我開會的人都知開會我會倒茶來飲」。而事後校委紀文鳳講完後，主席李國章亦沒要他倒茶。
另外，會上因學生會前會長馮敬恩拒絕簽署承諾書，確保其他校委安全，校委會最終以大比數投票通過要求馮離開會議。張祺忠稱，「表決時梗有12票出嚟」，故認為貌似恰當程序，實是「勝券在握」。tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb, i, ?( y. }# w- K) H
* R; u5 M- {1 l& y; `
張祺忠認為，現時港大不只校委間缺互信，校委與學生、校友和教職員亦無信任，未來討論港大深圳醫院墊支帳目、檢討校委會組成這些並非「非黑即白」的問題，或會引起爭論。1 l9 c, |# @' s+ |$ O) x7 Y" u( F
張祺忠又認為新任校委會主席李國章主持會議的風格，與前任主席梁智鴻不同，會議期間會截斷他人發言或有疊聲的情況。TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。. e/ T2 ?; f; m4 e7 H- u
4 w9 n Q, A' r
相關報道：明報/港台/DBC

歡迎光臨公仔箱論壇 (http://5.39.217.76/)