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標題: [時事討論] 力哲: 法治與公義 [打印本頁]

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2014-11-3 05:46 AM 標題: 力哲: 法治與公義

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2014-11-3 05:48 AM 編輯 公仔箱論壇/ Y' d( H5 }& s+ v$ _( ]5 i* D

力哲: 法治與公義

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佔領運動進行了超過一個月。各界對運動的意義和影響都進行了多番深入討論。「8.31」決定，警方過份武力，示威者長期堵路等，爭辯都離不開一個核心議題：法治。支持運動的普遍論述是，香港的制度存在著日益惡化的不公義，法治在如斯背景下將會面臨重大考驗。縱使抗爭者在法律條文上有違法之虞，但爭取一個公義的制度就是對民主的追求，民主保障法治，因此抗爭並未背離法治精神。另一邊廂，反對運動的意見認為抗爭者長期佔據馬路，視法律如無物，影響他人使用道路的權利。警方執法時更作出反抗，堅拒被清場，打擊警方依照法律執行法紀，嚴重破壞法治精神。雙方剖析法治的切入點南轅北轍，結論亦大相逕庭。這歸因於推論過程中雙方往往受預設的價值立場所局限：一方從理想入手，將法律的實際操作視為次要問題；另一方則從法律實行著手，以法律的順利運作視為法治入口。6 I/ k6 w! T0 v7 m8 d% r

歸根究底，論調之差異打從一開始就植根於雙方以法治的片面來推敲全面的意識形態，鮮有嘗試尋找理念和現實之間的析論。正如亞里士多德所言：「整體比它構成部分的總和為大。」法治的本質如此，我們對其理解亦應當如此，否則便是盲公摸象。本文會從分析法律結構出發，結合法治的內在條件，嘗試帶出一個揉合不同理解的思考方向。

為了恰當理解法治，我們先要梳理法律和法治之間的關係。法律是一個社群性觀念。自從人類有意識地攜手創造公共領域，法律的概念一直伴隨著生活的每一步。法律因社群而生，並且影響社群中人與人之間的互動和秩序。法律系統絕非只有條文本身，法律機構也是一個重要的組成部分。試問如果沒有立法機構，法院，執法機關等角色，法律如何運作？這些角色的形態隨時代而變遷，但其功能（不論是極權或民主國家）如出一轍：不外乎立法，執法，司法。當然，不同政治體制中法律的目的和意義不能相提並論，但重點絕不在此。即使是惡法、一旦成為正式法律，當權者仍然有權力執行法紀，捉拿犯罪者和進行審判，這就是法律權威裸露在人民面前的真面目。法律之所以為法律，按著名以色列法學及哲學家 Joseph Raz 的話語來解釋就是它本身擁有「令人遵守的權威性」，而並不是因為任何不證自明的正當性（legitimacy）。簡易之，法律就是權力。這是對所有（不論公義與否）法律的最基本了解。正因為在不同時代和國家，法律的根本元素都大同小異；只有改變法律的內部互動和生態環境，法律的性格才會改變。這就是法治的入口，亦是法治功用之處。

「法治」一詞是近代產物，一般認為最早出現於 1885 年的英國。儘管如此，法治的觀念早已在社會萌芽，甚至在二千多年前的中國亦提出過不少法治觀念。幾千年來，法治的實踐都是以制度的形式在法律中擔當重要作用。法治暫時未有一個放之四海而皆準的定義，但其內容強調的原則－法律凌駕一切，司法獨立，不溯及既往等等－都是現代社會所接納和推崇。法治的特點是它可以植入於制度本身，以有機的方式進化，為更好的法治創建更好的條件，改變整個法律的生態系統。例如17，18 世紀由英國著名哲學家約翰・洛克（John Locke）及法國哲學家孟德斯鳩（Montesquieu）提倡三權分立後，法治的發展更如雨後春筍。值得注意的是，法治有其實際的構造和原則、亦即制度性和精神性、兩者是不可分割的。任何強調其中一方的論述都是以偏概全。法治就像骨幹，法律就是血肉。正常健康的骨架是承托法律的必要條件。這亦說明了為什麼「依法的法治」（Rule by Law）是築立在「以法的法治」（Rule of Law）之上。

自從「佔中」發生以來，坊間流行著一種很多人接納的論述，我稱它為「法治精神論」。法治精神論圍繞的主題是體現法治精神的方式，內容與20 世紀末德國思想大師哈貝馬斯（Jürgen Habermas）的溝通行為理論相映成趣。法治精神論指出，民主社會透過公平的制度立法，因此在民主社會中守法是對其程序公義的認同。但香港缺乏完全的民主制度，爭取民主自然成為擁護法治之舉。民主保障法治，法治創造民主。因此，一時的違法絕不能談上有違法治精神，何況接受法律制裁就是體現對法治制度的尊重。「我犯法，但無罪」就是其令人引以為傲的結論，其精神的代言詞。這說明了支持運動的一方是以開拓公義為法治精神的依據。
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要釐清法治精神之真箇，當代著名法哲學家朗・富勒（Lon Fuller）在《法律的道德性》中提出的「法律的內在道德性」(inner morality of law) 最為入木，提供了不錯的立腳點。富氏認為，一條法令是否合法並不在於其功能或程序的合法性，而是法律內在的道德價值。他進一步提出法治之八點條件，說明法律系統的最低要求。換句話說，假如法律背後的理據是合乎公義原則，尊重背後意義和由此顯生出來的法律就是尊重法治。然而，我們必須明白，追求公義與尊重法治絕無必然關係。打個比方，有人殺了人但經審判後獲判無罪。無論有任何正當理由（例如殺人犯會繼續殺人），沒有人可以犯法來代替法庭執行公義。公義存在於法律背後的理性論述之中，亦立足於法律條文之外的道德世界。公義從不囿於單一價值系統和角度。由此可見，尊重法治和法律背後公義原則並不一定保障絕對的公義。同一道理，追求公義並不代表堅守了法治精神。

那麼，究竟佔領人士有否違反法治精神？在一定程度上，答案是肯定的。他們長期佔領馬路，影響他人使用道路的權利，明顯違反了該法律背後的公義原則。TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。4 s1 m7 @* `' {

法治所凌駕不單止是權力，而是任何種類的意識形態和理念。聖賢的統治可能是絕對的公義，但在法治的語境上，行公義並不能成為逃避法律約束的正當理由。如果以為法治是完備統治制度的一種工具而忽略法治對理念的約束性，那麼我們只抓住了經紗，但卻沒抓住緯紗。盱衡法律在人類歷史中巋然不動的地位，可窺見出其強大的約束性包含廣寬的意義。英國法哲學大師哈特（H. L. A. Hart）因此認為即使法律有不義之處，我們都有遵守法律的道德義務（moral obligation）。換過說法，這是對法律和法治的保護。重要的是，追求公義和遵守法律之間的迄界線就是要求法律改變的社會道德準則，但如果兩者不是在同一法律之上論述，公義和法治就是兩個議題，不應混為一談。
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按上文分析，雖然佔領人士的行為實質表現了對法治的不敬，但我反對任何認為佔領人士嚴重破壞法治的指控。不尊重法治精神和破壞法治是兩碼子的事。先頭說過，法治有其制度性和精神性。佔領人士對法治的衝擊是短期和有限度的，並未對法律制度本身有任何實質的破壞，遑論對法治有長遠負面影響。相反，我們身處的香港正面臨嚴重衝擊法治制度的挑戰。法律學者 Randall Peerenboom 認為法治的定義有兩種類：「實質的」法治概念和「形式的」法治概念。前者包含對經濟體制、政治體制和人權概念的關注，相對「形式的法治」更廣義地注重法治所彰顯的公義。近年立法會監察香港行政機關的能力變得薄弱，民主步伐遲緩甚至倒退，中央政府對香港內務過分干預，都是對法治制度本身的潛在威脅。約翰・洛克在《政府論》便說過：「沒有任何人可以在文明社會裡免除於法律之外。」今天隨著國家機器變得更強大，人民更暴露在法律之中。政府更有責任保持法治制度的穩健性，以保障人民得到公義的法律，在公義的社會中安居樂業。正所謂「法者，天下之儀也。所以決疑而明是非也，百姓之所懸命也」(《管子・禁藏篇》) 法律的巍峨宮殿就立足於此。2 o" m: F& h( W: r( J

今天的抗爭是爭取明天的民主。但在佔領一事上法治一詞往往如同魔咒，任何認為示威者不尊重法治的指控都好像侮辱抗命之神聖。很多人都承認自己違法，卻對自己不尊重法治一事嗤之以鼻，甚至極力否認。哲學上，其中一個出口顯然是「倫理雙果原則」（doctrine of double effect）：行為和意圖是不可同日而語，因此道德評價會隨行為意圖改變。然而，如以上所述，追求公義和不尊重法治是沒有抵觸；而不尊重法治和破壞法治更沒有必然關係。世界有著不同的道德價值，公義並不會永恆地表表述在某一價值之上。我們必須切記，如果每個人都將自己的道德價值授予公義之意涵，法治精神將會受到根本的衝擊。Rule of law 跟rule by law 不是對立的概念。但當每事都以哲學或理想解讀時、我們其實已經陷入rule by law 的境地、甚至「人治」思維。現代法治之所以能夠深植於社會彰顯公義，就是因為文明社會賦與的民主思維能夠保證法律平衡了不同道德價值的差異。在廣義法治的語境上，19 世紀法國古典自由主義理論家弗雷德里克・巴斯夏（Frédéric Bastiat）的洞見是值得我們深思的，「法律是防止不公義的公共力量，一言以蔽之，法律就是公義」。這裡的法律，就是我們追求的民主與法治。
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作者: felicity2010 時間: 2014-11-3 11:45 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2014-11-3 11:49 AM 編輯
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Excerpts from Ronald Dworkin. Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory  by Stephen Guest
Objectivity in Law and Morality公仔箱論壇7 Z7 W, K% Z- t  Y  ^6 C; v+ L( c- i

The problem of objectivity is what many people find as the major stumbling block to understanding Dworkin’s theory. It comes as a surprise to people that Dworkin thinks there are right answers to evaluative, and therefore moral, questions. Nevertheless, most people think there are right answers to such questions. People disagree whether abortion is morally permissible, for example, and their disagreement is just about what is right. Those who think it wrong and those who think it right at least agree that there is a“right or wrong” about it. In what follows, unlike the pattern of the rest of the book, I have traced Dworkin’s arguments in chronological order. Not only do we get a fuller understanding but there is pedagogic interest in the way his present thesis—that truth in law is dependent on nothing more mysterious (or less mysterious) than correct legal argument—was developed from two early ideas. The first lies in his attack on Devlin’s idea that public opinion was a criterion of morality and the second lies in his idea that there were practical reasons why the positivists would choose provability—or demonstrability as he used to call it—as a criterion of truth in law (e.g., accordance with a rule of recognition).5.39.217.76( W7 ?5 o  o( ~! l$ g
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LORD DEVLIN AND TAKING A MORAL POSITIONTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。+ t2 A) a! b$ A9 F$ ^1 W
Dworkin’s first arguments about the objectivity of moral reasoning arose in his criticism of Lord Devlin’s thesis that, in certain instances, the state has the right to use the criminal law to enforce matters of morality. The state could gauge what was a matter of morality by using the ordinary juryman’s view (that of the man in the “Clapham omnibus”) based on his deep feelings of intolerance,indignation and disgust.” Devlin had put forward this thesis in his famous lecture of 1958. Unlike most of Devlin’s critics, Dworkin sees merit in the general thesis because of the direct connection it makes between democracy and morality. The idea of a consensus permitting different moral views is genial to democracy in which each individual should enjoy equality of respect; the Clapham man’s vision contains an implicit egalitarian premise that the ordinary man’s views count in determining our moral environment.

Dworkin analyses the assumptions that Devlin makes about the nature of morality.Dworkin thinks that the idea of a “public morality” is more complex than the description of a juryman’s feeling at a particular time can allow, and that Devlin is wrong to suppose that an accurate gauge of it could be gleaned from crude expressions of public feeling. Instead, public feeling, or juryman outrage,is subject to a rational “sieve” which sorts out mere expressions of feeling from expressions of a genuine “moral position.”

We must, for example, produce reasons for our views.3 They do not have to be particularly abstract or philosophical but the expectation is that we should at least understand that there are reasons for what we claim. (“I hate gays.”“Why?” “Oh, no reason.”) And prejudiced views are not moral views.# l, s, V. Z- g. ?/ U
The person who says, “I hate gays because they are sissies” fails to express a genuinely moral position. Naturally, this is not to say that what counts as a prejudiced point of view will never be controversial; you and I may disagree whether our different views on positive discrimination, for example, are based on prejudice. The common view that “everyone is prejudiced” is not at all helpful, either, for that just means that we all have different views, some right and some wrong. Mistakes of fact, too, do not qualify as moral reasons.To use Hart’s well-known example, it was wrong of the Emperor Justinian to have said that homosexuality was morally bad because it caused earthquakes, for there is just no evidence to show any connection between homosexuality and earthquakes. Emperor Justinian’s view did not constitute a moral position:there is no factual evidence upon which his view could conceivably have been based. (I assume he meant that being gay incurred the wrath of God, who caused earthquakes, but if so, there are still problems with the view.)

Mere repetition of a view is insufficient to establish a moral position,too. The person who says that homosexual conduct is wrong because “a friend told him so” supplies an insufficient reason since we expect the genuine expression of a moral view to be one which a person endorses himself to be true. That is not to deny that we can learn from others, or that there might be a special category of religious reasons of an authoritative sort. Emotional reactions also are insufficient. “That action makes me sick” is not a sufficient reason since we expect a reason why, and in any case we think that one good way of attacking a moral position as confused is by simply saying that the argument for it is emotive. We tend to think here with persistent emotive statements that the speaker is obsessive, or has a phobia. It is easy to imagine other sorts of disqualifying reasons once we get the idea. The rules of logic must hold some sway, and there are all sorts of subjects about which we just can’t have moral views. You just cannot have moral views about gold, for example, and you can’t consider tempests irresponsible.
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Dworkin’s chief point is that a community consensus on morality runs deeper than a surface description of what people in fact, at a certain time and in a certain mood, think or feel. Any sensible conception of consensus exists at the level of reason or conviction and crosses surface differences. To those who are suspicious of any attempt to oppose “the common man’s view”with “reason,” it will come as a surprise to learn that Dworkin is not opposed to the ideas both that there is a community morality (democracy, for example)and that the community’s morality should count. “What is shocking and wrong”about Lord Devlin’s thesis, says Dworkin, “is not his idea that the community’s morality counts, but his idea of what counts as the community’s morality.”tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb. u0 I9 h1 G! ?! C$ ~0 p9 |; x( \
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CONVENTION AND CONSENSUS AS BASES FOR MORALITY4 u  L+ H/ [% ?4 t3 ~& R
From his criticism of Devlin, it becomes clear that the difference between a convention and a public consensus is important for Dworkin. In his view, morality is not constituted by public conventions which say conduct is morally required or permitted by the test of what most people think. Otherwise slavery would have been right once, or we would be driven to weak justifications of the wrongness of, say, rape of the form “well, everybody thinks it is wrong.” A consensus instead means a coincidence of the same convictions.
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In our community there is a coincidence of independently held convictions that rape is morally wrong. But that fact of consensus is not the reason for thinking rape wrong since we think it is wrong for quite independent reasons, such as assault, dominance, distress, pain . . . the list is long. If rape were wrong by convention, there would be a parroting mistake of the sort I discussed in the previous section. Yet another way of putting it is to say the last reason one would give for saying that rape is wrong would be that everyone thought it to be wrong. That would be a disastrous way to teach children if it were the only way they were taught morality, for example.

Of course, some conventions provide a reason for behaving in a particular way as, for example, the convention that you take your hat off in church; this, however, turns out to be only the conviction that you should not offend others and you follow the convention in order not to do so. It is not that you follow the rule simply because other people consider that you should. There is, true, a misleading and unimportant sense in which morality is defined by convention, as where we say, “Theirs was a morality of slavery.” The triviality, and danger, of the use of the word “morality” in that phrase becomes clear when we use phrases such as “the morality of the Nazi party was immoral.”The relevant distinction here was drawn neatly by Bentham and Austin between“positive” and “critical” morality; positive morality being social conventions created by man (and hence possibly evil) and critical morality the standards by which those social conventions are judged. Hart later used the distinction in Law, Liberty and Morality against Lord Devlin’s equation of public consensus with morality in order to show that public consensus in itself might harbor prejudice, lack of logic, repetition of views and so on.$ |% m0 \5 u5 A: C' E( H( O& I/ p

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