0 O, N, Z+ A3 b5 d5.39.217.76 ; E7 x$ b9 D" Z6 O) z+ J* T公仔箱論壇英國《金融時報》 托尼•巴伯作者: felicity2010 時間: 2011-12-6 08:40 AM
本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2011-12-8 12:53 AM 編輯 4 k3 n+ H* U! w+ W* W公仔箱論壇- R; v: I8 ~1 y4 O* F. e$ P 3 X( }, x* R+ P. [3 P( k2 _) \tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb怎樣拯救歐元？ Joseph E. Stiglitz5.39.217.763 j, k s) b. M
% Q6 C: x9 ~; ^% Z) j 0 c M. N( i3 w$ m |8 n% a$ U5 z有時候事情看上去並不會變得很糟，但實際上卻並非如此。即就是歐元區一些看似“負責”的成員國也將面臨更高的利率。而大西洋兩岸的歐美經濟學家們現在討論的已經不是歐元能否生存下來的問題，而是如何確保歐元體系的崩潰只帶來最小的動蕩。 / Y0 _! M3 k! H8 @0 w5 A 3 Q" Z& |3 M- p4 f公仔箱論壇儘管歐洲各國領導致力於挽救歐元，但在維繫歐元運作的必要措施方面，各國領導對此的認識缺陷卻逐漸暴露出來。歐元體系建立伊始，主流觀點認為維繫歐元體系的運作只需在財政方面進行約束，即，各成員國的財政赤字或公共債務應與各國國內生產總值相適應。經濟危機前，愛爾蘭和西班牙仍有預算結餘，並保持較低的債務值。然而，很快一切都化為烏有，兩國都陷入財政赤字，債台高築。所以，當今歐洲各國領導都指出控制各成員國的經常項目赤字才是當務之急。 % e/ N1 Y. Y: ?公仔箱論壇 ) o/ f3 v; H2 g6 B& t1 p0 HTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。如果真是這樣，那麼隨著經濟危機的蔓延，美國這個常年保持經常項目赤字的國家卻成了全球投資者的避風港，就顯得不合常理了。而歐盟將如何分辨政府為創造有利投資環境以及增加外國直接投資而造成的“良性”經常性項目赤字和“不良”經常性項目赤字呢？要想避免“不良”經常性項目赤字，那麼對於私營部門的幹預則應該遠遠大於歐元區建立時頗受歡迎的新自由主義以及單一市場原則所倡導的程度。+ u- Z" a: ^- A' \
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以西班牙為例，私營部門的資金主要來自私有銀行。而受這種非理性繁榮的影響，政府是否應被迫削減公共投資呢？而這是否又意味著政府必須決定這其中哪一種資金流是不良的（如，投資房產的資金），從而這種投資是否應繳納稅款或者被限制呢？我個人覺得這樣的政策會行之有效。但是對於歐盟自由市場的倡導者而言，這些政策只會招來極大的不滿。TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。( ]8 D. _) D# J+ w' f' W/ b6 o
s+ S$ c! W( w* f為了尋求一個明確簡單的答案。人們的注意力再一次集中到每次金融危機過後的討論之上。每一次金融危機結束，總有相應的解釋出現。而這些解釋總是在下一次金融危機到來時被推翻或者至少證明其不全面。二十世紀八十年代的拉美經濟危機是由於過度貸款造成的。而這個解釋卻不適用於1994年的墨西哥經濟危機，因為這一次危機的原因是由於儲蓄不足。 - m5 k Y+ Z4 A. q, W2 v I+ j! T 1 _$ G( q5 l! Q0 ` U3 A公仔箱論壇而緊接著到了東亞經濟危機。東亞擁很高的儲蓄率，但這一次問題出在“管理方式”之上。在享有世界上最透明管理方式的斯堪的納維亞國家幾年前遭受金融危機時，這個解釋則又成了無稽之談。 7 i9 J2 ]# `0 c2 [ # c! \2 ?" j9 i- o- I d7 V公仔箱論壇但值得注意的是，這些金融危機，包括2008年的金融危機，都有一個共通的線索，即，金融行業表現欠佳，未能准確評估信用度，在危機出現時，未能及時處理。 U- Z7 E8 L7 M( w; q
# ~0 I. ]2 f6 |) l' }; |無論有沒有歐元，這些問題都會出現。但是對於政府來說，歐元的出現使得這些問題變得更加棘手。而現在的問題不僅只是：歐元的崩潰將使得各國喪失兩大調節方式（利率以及彙率），以及歐洲央行的權限主要集中於控制通貨膨脹；而且，現在各國政府還面臨失業，增長速度慢，以及金融市場不穩定的挑戰。失去了共同財政管理體系的統一市場只會為稅收競爭敞開大門。各國會通過降低稅收的方式來吸引投資並增加可以在歐盟區自由交易產品的產出。 ; [- Z0 v. Y5 N9 x8 Y8 N: Otvb now,tvbnow,bttvbtvb now,tvbnow,bttvb7 p0 B) a/ T+ Y/ n" c$ L3 o
再者，自由勞動流動意味著個人可以選擇是否為自己的父母輩還債——愛爾蘭的年青人只需要離開自己的國家就不用在為政府愚蠢的銀行擔保買單。當然，移民可以使勞動力按照收益重新分配，本身當然無可厚非。但是，這種方式的移民實際是在削弱生產力。TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。3 ]4 G* d% ?2 U- X
- c& i9 P9 {/ K/ s; D5 \TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。What Can Save the Euro? Joseph E.Stiglitz$ R- Q3 `* A. t% ?+ R- y7 ?
4 b; ]9 E) M+ k; o& Stvb now,tvbnow,bttvb . B& h- K3 v$ g+ A |0 E) B5.39.217.76Just when it seemed that things couldn’t get worse,it appears that they have. Even some of the ostensibly “responsible” members of the eurozone are facing higher interest rates. Economists on both sides of the Atlantic are now discussing not just whether the euro will survive, but how to ensure that its demise causes the least turmoil possible. 6 K6 V5 c" j) _TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。9 V+ C' J6 `( O. S
It is increasingly evident that Europe’s political leaders, for all their commitment to the euro’s survival, do not have a good grasp of what is required to make the single currency work. The prevailing view when the euro was established was that all that was required was fiscal discipline– no country’s fiscal deficit or public debt, relative to GDP, should be too large. But Ireland and Spain had budget surpluses and low debt before the crisis, which quickly turned into large deficits and high debt. So now European leaders say that it is the current-account deficits of the eurozone’s member countries that must be kept in check. ! ?! y% C3 n; q! s% RTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。 ( l, r% X" l0 d2 m. L" p5.39.217.76In that case, it seems curious that, as the crisis continues, the safe haven for global investors is the United States, which has had an enormous current-account deficit for years. So, how will the European Union distinguish between “good” current-account deficits – a government creates a favorable business climate, generating inflows of foreign direct investment – and “bad”current-account deficits? Preventing bad current-account deficits would require far greater intervention in the private sector than the neoliberal and single-market doctrines that were fashionable at the euro’s founding would imply.5.39.217.76$ g8 S7 G& T3 m [( t
# v& r! `2 ]9 NIn Spain,for example, money flowed into the private sector from private banks. Should such irrational exuberance force the government, willy-nilly, to curtail public investment? Does this mean that government must decide which capital flows –say into real-estate investment, for example – are bad, and so must be taxed or otherwise curbed? To me, this makes sense, but such policies should be anathema to the EU’s free-market advocates. 4 L$ }5 c8 b2 s2 P/ z/ A2 x公仔箱論壇 8 M& \" _" |3 r# H htvb now,tvbnow,bttvbThe quest for a clear, simple answer recalls the discussions that have followed financial crises around the world. After each crisis, an explanation emerges, which the next crisis shows to be wrong, or at least inadequate. The 1980’s Latin American crisis was caused by excessive borrowing; but that could not explain Mexico’s1994 crisis, so it was attributed to under-saving. 0 m i' u7 o8 A; y' ^' D) o K! }tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb ! b- X, Z, P- {5 ]) T1 F& q# X公仔箱論壇Then came East Asia,which had high savings rates, so the new explanation was “governance.”But this, too, made little sense, given that the Scandinavian countries – which have the most transparent governance in the world – had suffered a crisis a few years earlier.( V/ B2 d3 ]4 `
, T, ]8 Q) @3 i! L+ P' [+ m( l, sTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。There is, interestingly, a common thread running through all of these cases, as well as the 2008 crisis: financial sectors behaved badly and failed to assess creditworthiness and manage risk as they were supposed to do. + V( S) J3 t3 Q6 G, ~: r! zTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。, z6 c+ s2 O* L$ r7 G0 y
These problems will occur with or without the euro.But the euro has made it more difficult for governments to respond. And the problem is not just that the euro took away two key tools for adjustment – the interest rate and the exchange rate – and put nothing in their place, or that the European Central Bank’s mandate is to focus on inflation, whereas today’s challenges are unemployment, growth, and financial stability. Without a common fiscal authority, the single market opened the way to tax competition – a race to the bottom to attract investment and boost output that could be freely sold throughout the EU. 4 ^2 J! W9 {6 O* D5 ^; E5.39.217.76; D' [2 V) Q1 r( F9 U! C
Moreover, free labor mobility means that individuals can choose whether to pay their parents’ debts: young Irish can simply escape repaying the foolish bank-bailout obligations assumed by their government by leaving the country. Of course, migration is supposed to be good,as it reallocates labor to where its return is highest. But this kind of migration actually undermines productivity.4 ^* t1 T1 [; Y" ?2 R+ U% v
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Migration is, of course, part of the adjustment mechanism that makes America work as a single market with a single currency. Even more important is the federal government’s role in helping states that face, say, high unemployment,by allocating additional tax revenue to them – the so-called “transfer union”so loathed by many Germans." K+ x4 d! h1 S+ n* @9 A' s1 l: ?( a
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But the US is also willing to accept the depopulation of entire states that cannot compete. (Some point out that this means that America’s corporations can buy senators from such states at a lower price.) But are European countries with lagging productivity willing to accept depopulation?Alternatively, are they willing to face the pain of “internal” devaluation, a process that failed under the gold standard and is failing under the euro? % e) N. ^: P2 b$ B6 j : J3 s3 d! w- a/ V1 G5.39.217.76Even if those from Europe’s northern countries are right in claiming that the euro would work if effective discipline could be imposed on others (I think they are wrong), they are deluding themselves with amorality play. It is fine to blame their southern compatriots for fiscal profligacy,or, in the case of Spain and Ireland,for letting free markets have free reign, without seeing where that would lead.But that doesn’t address today’s problem: huge debts, whether a result of private or public miscalculations, must be managed within the euro framework. $ ]! h; K( j7 }, x8 l6 | - d; A# V2 s) }+ H& G, X公仔箱論壇Public-sector cutbacks today do not solve the problem of yesterday’s profligacy; they simply push economies into deeper recessions. Europe’s leaders know this. They know that growth is needed. But, rather than deal with today’s problems and find a formula for growth, they prefer to deliver homilies about what some previous government should have done. This may be satisfying for the sermonizer, but it won’t solve Europe’s problems – and it won’t save the euro. , P- Q5 Y" ^7 u( r7 t8 @5 [tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb% x0 t: w8 F1 W% Z
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。- _* u$ z: q5 F; }: `$ X Joseph E. Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University, a Nobel laureate in economics, and the author of Freefall:Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy. 5 G' Q; _1 F* W b4 ?TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。作者: felicity2010 時間: 2011-12-6 08:46 AM
本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2011-12-6 08:51 AM 編輯 " |- q1 E: u! ^- m( _" e! e & K' ~5 u) ^# i2 B% f. {" fThe Poetry of the Euro Harold JamesTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。4 O C' V% R' x% {
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The purpose of creating a common currency has been largely and surprisingly forgotten in crisis-torn Europe.Instead, there seem to be more pressing concerns: gloomy speculation about the eurozone’s impending collapse and desperate attempts to find institutional fixes to its extensive governance problems. H) ~) [4 _* q9 ~/ U; j( z/ b- K; B公仔箱論壇0 g/ P5 z' `2 ~# g3 ?0 k
But the euro was not just the outcome of an idiosyncratic quest to reduce the wear on pockets stuffed with odd national coins, or to facilitate intra-European trade. The bold European experiment reflected a new attitude about what money should do, as well as how it should be managed. In opting for a “pure” form of money, created by a central bank independent of national authority, Europeans self-consciously flew in the face of what had become the dominant monetary tradition. tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb) V# P* V7 f: G Z, M" l
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In the twentieth century, the creation of money –paper money – was usually thought to be the domain of the state. Money could be issued because governments had the power to define the unit of account in which taxes should be paid. This tradition went back well before paper, or fiat,currencies. For many centuries, even while metallic money circulated, the task of defining units of account – livres tournois, marks, gulden, florins, or dollars – remained a task of the state (or of those with political power). 8 d ~* z; M8 A" S& k/ r: N公仔箱論壇- w, L( {4 a" h* \. z4 z# B: S" g
Abuse of this role, with governments addressing excessive debt by inflating it away, was deeply destructive of political order in the first half of the twentieth century. After World War II, the liberal politicians most committed to European federalism saw this point clearly. The economist, central-bank governor, finance minister, and president of the Italian Republic, Luigi Einaudi, pleaded the case in the immediate aftermath of the war: “If the European federation takes away from the individual states the power of running public works through the printing press, and limits them to expenses that are financed solely by taxes and voluntary loans, it will by that act alone have accomplished a great work.”公仔箱論壇7 z D0 B1 t x9 b+ s' T H
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But monetary abuse is no less dangerous in political systems with multi-layered authority, and in the past often led to the breakup of federal states. That is because inflation is not a benign cure for economic ills, in which beneficent and stimulatory effects are spread equally over the entire region under the inflationary monetary authority. Making inflation depends on the central bank’s decision to monetize specific debt instruments. / H2 u v5 w' }9 M9 X( G- L J$ E9 \9 W/ M
After all, the monetary authority never decides simply to convert every obligation into money. Instead, it decides that some industries, banks, or political authorities need to be sustained for the general good. Those industries, banks, and political authorities that are not so privileged are inevitably resentful, and view the central bank’s actions as an abuse of power. In federal systems, in particular, those businesses and political authorities far removed from the center are most likely to be excluded from the monetary stimulus and hence are inclined to be resentful. 7 ^. o) d. I7 R5 t! r$ H5.39.217.76 - }% T1 U; k* m& Y5.39.217.76Hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920’s fanned separatism in Bavaria,the Rhineland,and Saxony, because these remote areas thought that Germany’s central bank and central government in Berlin were discriminating against them. The separatists were politically radical – on the left in Saxony,and on the far right in Bavaria and the Rhineland.5.39.217.766 M) C6 Q# D* f
- R6 C% L& k) b* xtvb now,tvbnow,bttvbThere are also more recent cases of the same effect. In late-1980’s Yugoslavia, as the socialist regime disintegrated, the monetary authorities in Belgrade were inevitably closest to Serbian politicians such as Slobodan Milošević and to Serbian business interests. As a result, the Croats and Slovenes wanted out of the federation. In the Soviet Union,inflation appeared as an instrument of Moscow bureaucrats, and there, too, more remote areas sought to break away. ( \4 U# ]* M, X$ ]9 @1 r, M. s6 @! a8 I) GTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。' F2 e% E# o# J
The makers of modern Europe saw that unstable and politically abused money would be a European nightmare,and lead to destructive national animosities and antagonisms. They were supported by the twentieth century’s two most influential economists, Friedrich von Hayek and John Maynard Keynes. . P# I, b0 k' d% T! ~" O5.39.217.76$ s$ S" ?% p( n4 z/ v
Hayek was the most consistent critic of state-produced money. His proposal, competitive currencies produced by “free banking” in which numerous private authorities would issue their own money, was more radical than the solution adopted by Europeans in the 1990’s. But the Hayekian element of a money-issuing authority that was extensively protected against political pressures, and consequently against political opprobrium, was a key part of the European Union’s Maastricht Treaty. Keynes, too, in planning for the postwar order, proposed a synthetic global currency that would guarantee stability and prevent deflation.6 @7 t, d) Q. ~& P
+ }, ?3 |/ Q% yThe vision of central-bank independence as a necessary part of the constitution of a sound and stable political order was not simply a European construct in the 1990’s. It was also reflected in legislative changes affecting other central banks, and in central bankers’ growing prestige. ' P ~# `. P! x6 `5 F/ W/ l5.39.217.76 # d/ c$ H$ ~) lTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。That view is now seriously challenged. In the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since WWII, central banks are once again being called on to monetize securities issued by some debtors, but not others.That task of selecting between debtors is highly political, and poisons the idea of monetary stability. 3 k2 O) p: M! l1 l' oTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。 1 z" `: K p: Q! f4 q" gJean-Claude Trichet, until recently the president of the European Central Bank, liked to claim that money was like poetry, before adding that both give a sense of stability. That unusual but accurate formulation is reminiscent of General August Neidhardt von Gneisenau’s famous reply to the Prussian King, who dismissed as “nothing more than poetry” von Gneisenau’s patriotic concerns in the early nineteenth century. “Religion,prayer, love of one’s ruler, love of the fatherland, what are these but poetry?” von Gneisenau asked. “Upon poetry is founded the security of the throne.”9 W) Q5 T8 D i# ?/ `+ B
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。# a& r% }# I& y& H3 E
Stable money, too, is the foundation of political order. We should not allow ourselves to be so overwhelmed by today’s crisis that we forget that.tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb% V- O0 _( [$ k4 K1 Z) W5 x [7 Z2 r
4 p9 I* _: Q) N公仔箱論壇) s, c+ m* A% e, m6 J1 K% q. P8 x Harold James is Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University and Professor of History at the European University Institute, Florence. He is the author of The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle.作者: aa00 時間: 2011-12-6 11:27 AM
跨国企业开始为欧元区解体作准备 ' P+ e/ @. ?; |0 U+ J( y B. ]
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欧元区解体还是那样遥远吗? 1 O: x0 [3 U: ^0 B# q6 C! s) w 9 e, k* T% b0 B% qtvb now,tvbnow,bttvb 5 x, r C, s5 F. l7 b- ]5.39.217.76公仔箱論壇9 B' }& Q# j- p; G6 b9 `
* k9 L$ V; @; A/ B5 D& q, ~公仔箱論壇 % P$ M. k4 Y$ Z# r# Ftvb now,tvbnow,bttvb英国《金融时报》日前发表文章称，欧洲许多大型企业已经开始为欧元区解体后的情形作打算。因为他们害怕，欧洲政治层无法掌控愈演愈烈的债务危机。# f# ^- p/ L2 W& a: s& N6 ^
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。2 o0 n0 `+ g/ [* v" [9 m( V% E. E
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$ R' @: `1 k& `: j5 Y. J7 v欧洲债务危机的威胁已经不再仅仅存在于金融领域 ,许多实体企业现在也不得不将欧元区解体的这种可能性纳入制定未来发展战略的范畴。《金融时报》援引十几位跨国集团总裁表示，许多企业已经开始为欧元区可能解体制定应急方案。他们认为欧洲政治领导人目前无法抑制欧债危机扩散的局势，所以有必要防止这个不再是不可想象的一幕给公司带来负面冲击。当德国总理默克尔和法国总统萨科齐本月初提及希腊退出欧元区的可能性时，也就标志着欧盟高层领导人第一次敢于质疑这进行了13年的货币联盟实验。TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。) j. R+ P: p5 p
《金融时报》采访了跨国酒商帝亚吉欧（Diageo）欧洲部总裁摩根（Andrew Morgan），后者表示，该公司正在考虑"欧元区解体"将是怎样的情形。他指出："如果欧元区发生大规模的变动，那我们就将共同进入一个不同的境地。如果有国家离开欧元区，那它的货币将大幅贬值，使得进口产品的成本变得非常非常的昂贵。" & Q8 z1 C3 z2 L" p5 h* m5.39.217.76可能受此影响的企业包括汽车制造商、能源公司以及生产消费品的企业。目前，他们正努力通过安全的渠道投资，并减少不必要的开支。像西门子这样的工程企业集团甚至已经建立了自己的银行，以此直接购买欧洲央行的投资产品。公仔箱論壇+ ^) u9 Z0 I9 O( O, r) c
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